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PATENTING THE UNEXPLAINED
SEAN B. SEYMORE*
ABSTRACT
It is a bedrock principle of patent law that an inventor need not
understand how or why an invention works. The patent statute simply
requires that the inventor explain how to make and use the invention. But
explaining how to make and use something without understanding how or
why it works yields patents with uninformative disclosures. Their teaching
function is limited; one who wants to understand or figure out the
underlying scientific principles must turn elsewhere. This limited disclosure
rule does not align with the norms of science and tends to make patent
documents a less robust form of technical literature. To address this
problem, this Article proposes a two-tiered disclosure paradigm. While
compliance with the extant statutory disclosure requirements would still be
sufficient to obtain a patent, the inventor could opt to provide a mechanistic
disclosure-one that describes how and why the invention works. Providing
a mechanistic disclosure would have several upsides for the inventor,
improve patent (examination) quality, enrich the public storehouse of
technical knowledge, and promote broader goals of the patent system.
* Professor of Law and Professor of Chemistry, Vanderbilt University. J.D., University of
Notre Dame, 2006; Ph.D., Chemistry, University of Notre Dame, 2001; M.S.Chem., Georgia Institute
of Technology, 1996; B.S., University of Tennessee, 1993. Thanks to Jonas Anderson, Kevin Collins,
Timothy Holbrook, and Megan LaBelle for comments and criticisms on an earlier draft of this Article.
I owe special thanks to Dmitry Karshtedt, Mark Lemley, and Christopher Seaman for their wise
suggestions and thoughtful insights.
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INTRODUCTION
It might be surprising that an inventor can invent something and obtain
a patent without understanding how or why it works. Yet such knowledge
is not required.' If the patent document's disclosure is sufficiently detailed
to explain to those skilled in the technology of the invention how to make
and use the invention, that is enough to satisfy patent law's so-called
1. Eames v. Andrews (The Driven-Well Cases), 122 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1887) ("It may be that the
inventor did not know what the scientific principle was . . . . That does not vitiate the patent." (quoting
Andrews v. Cross, 8 F. 269, 277 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1881))); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720
F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[I]t is axiomatic that an inventor need not comprehend the scientific
principles on which the practical effectiveness of his invention rests."). See also infra Part II.A.
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enablement requirement.2 But this minimal disclosure threshold can
produce patents that are uninformative from a technical standpoint, meaning
that they provide little meaningful information to truly fulfill patent law's
disclosure function.' Uninformative patents have far-reaching and perhaps
unintended consequences that, until now, have been unexplored.
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose that an
inventor-researcher seeking to address the prevalence of stomach ulcers
discovers how to cure them by administering penicillin to affected
individuals. 4 Although the inventor can describe how to provide a
therapeutically effective dosage and disclose data from successful use in
human subjects, the inventor does not know how or why penicillin works.
Although penicillin is an antibiotic, the inventor cannot even identify which
(if any) bacteria are involved.' While figuring out these details might be
demanded for acceptance of the inventor's claim by the scientific
community,6 this minimal disclosure would be sufficient to satisfy patent
law's enablement requirement.'
Yet while enabling, the resulting patent raises several concerns that
cannot be overlooked. First, the patent document merely explains how to
2. Enablement is one of the three disclosure requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a):
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint
inventor of carrying out the invention.
35 U.S.C. § I12(a) (2012) (emphasis added). Enablement is discussed infra Part I.B.
3. See discussion infra Part I.A.
4. Successful treatment of stomach ulcers with penicillin was first reported in 1951. See
Lyudmila Boyanova, Historical Data, in HELICOBACTER PYLORI 2 (Lyudmila Boyanova ed., 2011).
5. Complicating matters was the widely held beliefin the scientific community that the stomach
was a sterile environment due to its acidity. Id.
6. See Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1508-09 (2011)
(discussing scientific gatekeeping and the requirements for communal acceptability). As for penicillin,
the scientific community initially rejected the findings because it was dogma that stomach ulcers were
caused by gastric acid due to stress or diet; any notion that a pathogen was involved was "regarded as
whimsical," and "the use of antibiotics or metallic ions were deemed to be quackery." Mark Kidd &
Irvin M. Modlin, A Century of Helicobacter pylori: Paradigms Lost-Paradigms Regained, 59
DIGESTION 1, 1 (1997).
7. In re Libby, 255 F.2d 412, 415 (C.C.P.A. 1958) ("It is not necessary that a patentee should
understand the scientific principles underlying his invention, so long as he makes a sufficient disclosure
to enable other persons skilled in the art to practice the invention."). The U.S. Courts of Customs and
Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) was a five-judge Article Ill appellate court on the same level as the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the C.C.P.A. See Pub. L.
No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of28 U.S.C.). The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") adopted C.C.P.A. decisional law as binding
precedent. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
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practice the invention' (or replicate what the inventor did). 9 Arguably this
does not go far enough-to be sure, scholars have criticized the current
enablement standard as being de minimis. 1 Interested researchers must fill
this knowledge void. Because they can rely on neither their own knowledge
nor knowledge in the technical field to figure out the omitted information,
interested researchers must engage in their own experimentation. But
experimental activity by anyone other than the patentee might require a
license to avoid liability for infringement."
Second, any subsequent experimentation may come at a point far into the
future-perhaps at the end of the twenty-year patent term 2-or maybe not
at all. But what if the inventor could have easily figured out how and why
the invention works and disclosed that information in the patent? That
would provide an enormous benefit to the public, which otherwise will get
nothing more than a "cookbook recipe" replicating what the inventor did.'"
This knowledge void should be a cause for concern given the tremendous
societal benefits that emanate from a robust patent disclosure.1 4 In the case
of drugs, for example, unraveling mechanistic information can lead to more
effective or less toxic versions.'" Relatedly, it is easier to develop new drugs
when researchers understand how old ones work.' 6
But figuring out how and why an invention works-what I now define
as mechanistic enablement-can also benefit the inventor. At present,
8. The courts often use the term "practice" when referring to the how-to-make and how-to-use
prongs of the enablement requirement of§ 112(a). See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(per curiam) ("To satisfy the enablement requirement of § 112 ... a patent application must adequately
disclose the claimed invention so as to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the invention at the
time the application was filed without undue experimentation.").
9. Cf In re Isaacs, 347 F.2d 887, 892 (C.C.P.A. 1965) ("All that an applicant need do is enable
a person skilled in the art to duplicate [the inventor's] efforts.
10. See sources cited infra notes 25, 142, and 270.
11. Practicing the claimed invention without the patentee's permission constitutes patent
infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."). And there is generally no
experimental use defense for third parties to figure out how and why the invention works. See infra Part
III.C.2. But it is also true that some infringers, particularly academic researchers, are rarely sued. See
infra note 141.
12. The patent term begins on the day of issuance and expires twenty years from the filing date.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
13. Cf MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 397 (4th ed. 2015)
(explaining that an enabling disclosure provides a "cookbook recipe" for those skilled in the technology
of the invention).
14. See infra Part I.A; Kevin Emerson Collins, The Structural Implications of Inventors'
Disclosure Obligations, 69 VAND. L. REv. 1785, 1790-91 (2016) (discussing the public-knowledge
theory of disclosure and its grounding in social benefit).
15. Carolyn Y. Johnson, One Big Myth About Medicine: We Know How Drugs Work, WASH.
POST: WONKBLOG (July 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/-wp/2015/07/23/one-
big-myth-about-medicine-we-know-how-drugs-work.
16. Id.
710
2019] PATENTING THE UNEXPLAINED 711
inventors have an incentive to claim as much as possible while disclosing
as little as possible." Such "overclaim[ing]" creates a statutory enablement
problem;' 8 nonetheless, inventors argue that broad claim scope is warranted
because the minimal disclosure provided can be extrapolated to other
embodiments of the invention" that have not been made or tested.20 This
argument is often suspect and unsuccessful. 21 But it would be much more
plausible if the inventor provided mechanistic enablement-thereby tying
everything together.2 2 Thus, mechanistic enablement could actually bolster
statutory enablement.23 So broader claim scope could be used as a carrot to
induce inventors to provide mechanistic enablement. This inducement could
also work in voluntary nondisclosure paradigms-scenarios where the
inventor knows mechanistic details but opts for nondisclosure because of
some perceived value of maintaining secrecy. 24
This Article explores uninformative patents, which have largely escaped
the attention of legal scholars and commentators. It also makes the
normative case for mechanistic enablement and explains how mechanistic
enablement aligns with broader policy goals of the patent system. This
Article is part of a larger project that seeks to develop a more robust
disclosure function for the patent system and to bridge the disconnect
between patent law and the norms of science.25
17. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
18. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1193 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 277 (1949)); see also
In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (explaining that the enablement requirement mandates
a "reasonable correlation" between what is claimed and what is disclosed in the patent).
19. An "embodiment" is a concrete, physical form of an invention described in a patent
application or patent. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 33 (7th ed. 2017).
20. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (evaluating the accused infringer's argument "that the broad scope of the claims is not supported
by the limited disclosure present").
21. See infra note 186 and accompanying text. This is more true nowadays since the Federal
Circuit is policing enablement more aggressively. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
22. See discussion infra Part IlI.B.1.
23. For an illustration, see infra Part Ill.B.2(a).
24. J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 960-61 (2011)
(explaining that "inventors will choose secrecy when the expected return from secrecy exceeds the
expected return from" disclosure); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533-34 (1966) (recognizing the
inventor's incentives to favor secrecy over full disclosure).
25. See generally Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56
UCLA L. REv. 127 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, Heightened Enablement] (proposing a new approach
for examining patent applications in unpredictable fields which, by requiring applicants to disclose
actual experimental results, resolves a striking incongruity between patent law and science); Sean B.
Seymore, The Teaching Function ofPatents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 621 (2010) [hereinafter Seymore,
Teaching Function] (proposing a disclosure regime that would allow patents to compete with other forms
of technical literature as a source of substantive technical information); Sean B. Seymore, The
Presumption ofPatentability, 97 MINN. L. REv. 990, 1037 (2013) [hereinafter Seymore, Presumption]
(articulating a proposal that "is designed to strike a balance between an inventor's need to file early and
a broader interest in using disclosure to promote the patent system's overarching goal of scientific and
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The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the
teaching function of patent documents. It begins by discussing the primacy
of disclosure in patent law and then explains how the enablement
requirement seeks to ensure that the disclosure is meaningful. Next, Part II
examines the rule that permits uninformative disclosures and explores the
problems that arise from it. Part III proposes a new disclosure paradigm with
mechanistic enablement. It also describes how to induce inventors to
provide mechanistic enablement, including its ability to bolster statutory
enablement and yield broader patent scope. Finally, Part IV discusses the
policy implications of the proposal, with a particular emphasis on how it
would promote patent law's disclosure function and help bridge the
disconnect between patent law and science.
I. PATENTS AS TEACHING DOCUMENTS
A principal function of the patent document, aside from providing notice
of the invention and its claimed scope,2 6 is to disclose details about the
invention to the public.2 7 An often-overlooked aspect of disclosure is
teaching. 28 The basic idea is that, while the patentee can exclude others from
practicing the invention until the patent term expires, the technical
information disclosed in the written description 29 has potential immediate
value to the public, 30 which can use the information for any purpose that
does not infringe upon the claims.' Thus, the patent document is a form of
technological progress").
26. See PSC Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int'l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("One important purpose of the written description is to provide notice to the public as to the subject
matter of the patent, while the claim provides notice as to the scope of the invention." (citing Bates v.
Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 39 (1878))).
27. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
28. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("[W]hile the role of the claims is to give public notice of the subject matter that is protected, the role of
the specification is to teach, both what the invention is (written description) and how to make and use it
(enablement).") (emphasis added).
29. The written description is the part of the patent document that completely describes the
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) ("The specification shall contain a written description .... it shall
conclude with one or more claims . . . ."). Although I will not do so in this Article, it is worth noting that
the terms "written description" and "specification" are often used interchangeably (and mistakenly) in
patent law. F. SCOTT KtEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 155 n.4 (5th ed. 2011).
30. As noted by one commentator:
Because every patent application contains a complete description of someone's technology,
and because patent applications are published, and now appear in on-line databases, you can
trawl [through them] for information vital to your own research and development efforts. Why
struggle to solve a technical problem already solved by another and published in an application?
Anthony Murphy, Intellectual Property, in INNOVATION: HARNESSING CREATIVITY FOR BUSINESS
GROWTH 87, 92 (Adam Jolly ed., 2003).
31. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 25, at 624 (citing Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel Ltd. [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] RPC 9 [77] (Hoffmann L) (UK)); cf PETER D.
ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 10 (1975) ("[Alnyone is free to think and to write about
712 [VOL. 96:707
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technical literature. 3 2
A. Disclosure and Patent Law's Teaching Function
The essence of the U.S. patent system is a quid pro quo between the
patentee and the public.3 3 The basic idea is that in order to promote the full
disclosure of information about the invention to the public, the patentee
must receive something in return.34 What the patentee gets is the limited
period of exclusivity conferred by the patent grant.35 The public gets
detailed knowledge about the invention as soon as the patent document
publishes 3 6 and possession of the invention at the end of the patent term.37
The inventive act produces two things that are potentially useful to the
public: the invention itself, which will be defined here as the subject matter
claimed in the patent (i.e., machine, product, process, composition of
matter), 3  and the disclosure, which furnishes technical details about the
invention (i.e., how to make it, how to use it). 3 9 Though the invention is
probably the first thing that comes to mind when patents are discussed, the
importance of the disclosure cannot be overlooked. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has said that "the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new
designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure."40
Why is disclosure so important? First, since the public gets many new
and useful things through trade secrecy, 4 1 the patent system incentivizes the
what is covered by the patent without trespassing upon the exclusive right of the patentee.").
32. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
33. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("[T]he patent system represents a
carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful
advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.").
34. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
35. Id. at 480 ("In return for the right of exclusion-this 'reward for inventions'-the patent laws
impose upon the inventor a requirement of diselosure." (citation omitted)).
36. See id. at 481 (explaining that when the information disclosed in a patent becomes publicly
available it adds to the "general store of knowledge" and assumedly will stimulate ideas and promote
technological development); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REv. 311, 332 (2008) ("[T]he public is free to read the patent and use the invention
once the patent expires twenty years after it is filed, and even before that time scientists can learn from
the patent disclosure and use that information to improve on the invention or to design around it.").
37. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 418 (1822) ("The object is to put the public in
complete possession of the invention . .. so that interference with it may be avoided while the patent
continues, and its benefits may be fully enjoyed by the public, after the patent expires.").
38. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor .... ).
39. See infra Part l.B.; Lemley, supra note 36, at 333 ("[I]t seems quite clear that dissemination,
not just invention, of new information is one of the goals of the patent system.").
40. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (emphasis added).
41. Famous examples are the public's enjoyment of Coca-Cola's syrup formula and use of
Google's search algorithm. See Van Lindberg, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OPEN SOURCE: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PROTECTING CODE 130 (2008) ("Nobody outside of Google knows the exact
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disclosure of information that the public might not otherwise get.42 This is
particularly important for "non-self-disclosing" inventions like complex
molecules or industrial processes, which cannot be easily replicated or
reverse engineered.4 3
Second, the disclosure conveys technical information (and becomes a
part of the technical literature),44 which "add[s] to the sum of useful
knowledge" 45 immediately-not at the end of the patent term but as soon as
the patent document publishes.4 6 Patent theory posits that the early entry of
useful information into the public storehouse of technical knowledge4 7
reduces research-and-development (R&D) waste, 48 spurs creativity, 49 leads
others "to climb onto the patentee's shoulders in seeking improvements or
details of its search algorithms and, despite the best efforts of the search engine optimization crowd,
nobody has been able to fully figure them out."); Andrew A Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for
Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 651 (2013) (discussing how Googlc's algorithm is a carefully
maintained trade secret which gives the company a "potentially perpetual monopoly"). Unlike patents,
trade secrets can last forever, as long as secrecy is maintained. See Michael Abramowicz & John F.
Duffy, The Inducement Standard ofPatentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1622 (2011) ("[T]rade secrecy
protection can theoretically provide even more powerful incentives than patents because trade secrecy
rights are potentially infinite in duration."); Anderson, supra note 24, at 923-27 (exploring the patent
vs. trade secret distinction).
42. The "incentive to disclose" rationale for patents is based on the notion that "the patent system
is designed to bring inventions out into public view." J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69
VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1585 (2016). Without the patent system, inventors would monetize their inventions
through trade secrecy, thereby depriving the public of the benefit of technical information about the
invention. Id. Thus, the quid pro quo-the patent bargain--is required to induce the inventor to disclose
(which adds this technical information to the public storehouse of knowledge). Katherine J. Strandburg,
The Research Exemption to Patent Infringement: The Delicate Balance Between Current and Future
Technical Progress, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 107, 108 (Peter K. Yu
ed., 2007).
43. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent
Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 81, 83; id. at 105-06 ("For such non-self-disclosing inventions, the
disclosure of the invention in the patent [document] is valuable to society .. . because it adds something
the inventor could have kept secret to the store of public technical knowledge.").
44. Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 400 (1960). Like
technical journals, for example, patent disclosures can show the state of technology, set forth what others
have already achieved, and provide technical information that others can avoid repeating. Seymore,
Teaching Function, supra note 25, at 623-24.
45. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
46. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that when the
information disclosed in a patent becomes publicly available it adds to the "general store of knowledge"
and assumedly will stimulate ideas and promote technological development); Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.
v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (explaining that a purpose of a patent system is "to add to the body of published
scientific/technologic knowledge"), vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
47. See cases cited supra note 46; In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(Baldwin, J., concurring) (noting that the full disclosure of how to make and use the invention "adds a
measure of worthwhile knowledge to the public storehouse").
48. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings ofPatent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247,267
n.79 (1994).
49. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481; see also MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION 15-19
(2008) (explaining that disclosure adds to the pool of accessible knowledge that other creative
individuals can use and improve upon).
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wholly new inventions,"5 and, of course, extends the frontiers of science
and technology.51
It is for these reasons that disclosure is regarded as the "centerpiece of
patent policy." 52 It produces a font of useful knowledge which, in turn,
promotes technological progress." But it is very easy for the public not to
get what it bargained for because "[t]here always exists, on the part of some
people, a selfish desire to obtain patent protection without making a full
disclosure." 54 This is why the law strives to secure the public's part of the
patent bargain by compelling applicants to comply with the statutory
patentability requirements.5 ' The requirements work individually and
collectively to ensure that the public gets a meaningful disclosure.
To illustrate, consider the basic purpose of each of the patentability
requirements. Novelty ensures that the invention is "new, that is, bestowed
for the first time upon the public by the patentee" 56 and protects knowledge
that the public already possesses. 57  Nonobviousness ensures that the
invention is "new enough"5 by denying patents for trivial extensions of
50. Dam, supra note 48, at 264; cf Rich, supra note 44, at 400 ("The literature of the art is
enriched, another way of doing something is made known and even if it be inferior to the means already
known, there is no telling when it may give another inventor an idea or when someone will improve on
it in such a way as to surpass all that is known.").
51. See Rich, supra note 44, at 400 ("Whenever novel subject matter, unobvious to the workers
of ordinary skill in an art, is published, progress in the art is promoted.").
52. Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV.
2007, 2011 (2005); see also Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (explaining that the patent
system should be viewed as "a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public
disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited
period of time").
53. See discussion infra Part l.B.
54. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 184 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled by In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 946
(C.C.P.A. 1967); cf Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779,
804 (2011) "[Applicants] have reasons to provide just enough information to satisfy § 112 and no more
so that the patentee could retain aspects of the invention as a trade secret, potentially providing a
competitive advantage in the market even after the patent is published or expires.").
55. The patentability requirements appear in Title 35 of the United States Code. Briefly, the
claimed invention must be useful, novel, nonobvious, and directed to patentable subject matter. 35
U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2012). In addition, the application must adequately describe, enable, and set forth
the best mode contemplated for carrying out the invention and conclude with claims that delineate the
invention with particularity. Id. § 112(a), (b).
56. 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 221, at 305
(Bos.: Little, Brown, & Co. 1890) (emphasis in original). Novelty ensures that an invention is new by
denying a patent if the claimed subject matter is identical to what is already known. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101-102; In re Marshall, 578 F.2d 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
57. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147 (1989) (noting that
Thomas Jefferson, the "driving force behind early federal patent policy," believed that "a grant of patent
rights in an idea already disclosed to the public [i]s akin to an ex post facto law, 'obstruct[ing] others in
the use of what they possessed before' (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 327 (Andrew
A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., Library ed. 1904))).
58. 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01.
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what is already known" and for inventions that would have come about
through ordinary technological progress. 60 The disclosure requirements 6'
ensure that, at the time of filing, the public can use the technical details
provided in the patent document to (1) improve upon or design around the
invention during the patent term; and (2) practice the invention either during
the patent term with a license or freely once the patent term expires. 62 The
patentable subject matter requirement63 ensuTes that the inventor makes a
meaningful and genuine contribution to the public by excluding things like
abstract ideas, laws of nature, mathematical formulas, physical phenomena,
and applied knowledge. 64 Together, these requirements ensure that the
Patent Office only awards patents for inventions that yield a meaningful
disclosure and support the patent system's broader mission of promoting
scientific progress and extending the frontiers of knowledge.6 ' As discussed
below, the patent system goes to great lengths to promote and safeguard the
disclosure function. 6 6
59. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1966); see also John F. Duffy, Inventing
Invention: A Case Study ofLegal Innovation, 86 TEx. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (2007) (exploring the wisdom of
denying patents for trivial inventions).
60. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Telcflcx Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007). If an invention lacks
nonobviousness, it would have inevitably come about through routine advances; thus the inducement of
a patent (and the accompanying disclosure) are thought to be unnecessary. ALAN DEVLIN,
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMics 261 (2014); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to
Whom? Evaluating Inventionsfrom the Perspective ofthe PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 886
(2004); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Anticipation and Obviousness as Possession, 65 EMORY
L.J. 987, 1028 (2016) (explaining that "[o]bviousness acts .. . as a form of constructive possession,
where the law treats the invention as being within the possession of the public even though the invention
has not been actually made or disclosed in its entirety.").
61. See supra note 2.
62. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. For an excellent exploration of the temporal
dynamic of patent disclosures, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Disclosures and Time, 69 VAND. L.
REv. 1459, 1480-1506 (2016).
63. See supra note 38.
64. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); see also Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (noting that such things are unpatentable without some inventive
concept in their applications); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010) ("The concepts covered by
these exceptions are 'part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none."' (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)));
Kevin Emerson Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1279, 1340
(2014) (arguing that Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2014), "prevents
knowledge-advances of any kind from being patent eligible subject matter").
65. This goal emanates from the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution: "To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoverics[.]" U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the constitutional
command is the patent system's "ultimate purpose"); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) ("[T]he primary purpose ofour patent laws .. . is 'to promote the progress
of science and useful arts' . . . " (citation omitted)).
66. But there are debates on whether it succeeds. Compare Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure,
94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 547-54 (2009) (cataloguing the beneficial uses for disclosure in patent law,
including stimulating innovation, preventing duplication, gauging patentability, and signaling research-
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B. The Enablement Requirement
An oft-touted justification for the patent system is that society will get
some benefit from the invention's disclosure.6 7 In theory, the disclosure
adds to the public storehouse of useful knowledge, which, in turn, promotes
technological progress.6 8 But this paradigm only works if the disclosure is
sufficiently robust from a technical standpoint to actually teach meaningful
information about the invention to the public.
Enablement is the patentability requirement with the principal task of
safeguarding the teaching function.69 It compels an applicant to prepare a
written description of the invention sufficient to teach a person having
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA)70 how to make and use it without undue
experimentation.7 ' The enablement requirement is the essential aspect of the
quid pro quo of the patent bargain7 2 because it constrains the scope of the
claims73 (which can be no broader than the enablement provided).74 This
and-development strength), and Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REv. 123,
133-47 (2006) [hereinafter Holbrook, Possession] (describing the "pervasive" role of disclosure in
patent law and policy, including enriching the state of the art contemporaneously with the invention and
showing evidence of possession of the invention), with Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of
Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 412 (2010) (arguing that "disclosure as an
objective of patent policy should be discarded in certain circumstances" because it "serves . . . an
ancillary role within the larger purpose of the patent regime"), Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting,
96 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1187 (2016) ("[P]atents rarely provide much in the way of useful scientific
knowledge in most industries; scientists who are doing research tend to look elsewhere than patents for
their learning."), and Note, supra note 52, at 2007 ("If disclosure is an important policy goal of the
patent system, then the system is in desperate need of repair.").
67. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 481 (1974) (explaining that the federal government "is willing to pay the high price" of exclusivity
conferred by a patent for its disclosure, which, "it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual
development of further significant advances in the art").
68. In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
69. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 3-4 (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT] (explaining that
enablement plays a central role in "safeguard[ing] the patent system's disclosure function by ensuring
relatively swift dissemination of technical information from which others . . . can learn").
70. The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the reasonably prudent person
in torts. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that
a PHOSITA is "not unlike the 'reasonable man' and other ghosts in the law"). Factors relevant to
constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical field include the sophistication of the technology,
the educational level of the inventor, the educational level of active workers in the field, the types of
problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the rapidity with which
innovations are made. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
71. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). While "undue experimentation" does
not appear in the statute, "it is well established that enablement requires that the specification teach those
in the art to make and use the invention without undue experimentation." In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731,
737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
72. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
73. Claim scope is the "technological territory" that the inventor claims is his or hers to control.
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REv. 839, 844 (1990).
74. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 121 (1854); see also Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc.
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ensures that: (1) the disclosure sufficiently enriches the public storehouse
of technical knowledge; and, (2) the public will get complete possession of
the invention once the patent expires.75
Enablement is a standard.7 ' Determining whether a disclosure was
enabling as of its filing date7 is a legal conclusion that rests on underlying
factual inquiries.7 ' The Federal Circuit set forth several factors relevant to
the enablement analysis in In re Wands. 7 9 They are: (1) the amount of
direction or guidance presented in the disclosure; (2) the existence of
working examples; (3) the nature of the invention; (4) the predictability or
unpredictability of the art; (5) the PHOSITA's level of skill; (6) the state of
the prior art (preexisting knowledge and technology already available to the
public);o (7) the scope of the claims;8 ' and, (8) the quantity of
experimentation necessary to practice the claimed invention.82 While not
mandatory,8 3 the Wands factors are ubiquitous in evaluating enablement8 4 _
probably because they touch on issues that are important in virtually all
enablement determinations. 8  These include issues related to the technical
scope and substance of the disclosure (factors one and two),86 the nature of
the technology (factors three and four), 7 the PHOSITA's knowledge and
skill (factor five),8 8 and the scope of the claim sought (factor seven).89
Given that enablement is a standard, the Wands factors can be
v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that enablement's
purpose is to "cnsure[] that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at
least commensurate with the scope of the claims."). The scope of enablement is the sum ofwhat is taught
in the written description plus what a PHOSITA already knows. Id.
75. See supra note 37.
76. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 25, at 130.
77. MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
("The enablement determination proceeds as of the effective filing date of the patent.").
78. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
79. 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
80. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(defining prior art). Prior art is used to determine the novelty or nonobviousness of claimed subject
matter in a patent application or patent. Id.
81. See supra notes 73-74.
82. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (factors reordered from original text).
83. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the
Wands factors are illustrative and not mandatory).
84. See 3 CHISUM, supra note 58, § 7.03 (collecting cases).
85. The factors are interrelated. For example, if the PHOSITA is really smart (factor five), an
applicant need not disclose what the PHOSITA already knows or can easily figure out (factors one and
two). Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
86. The two factors are clustered together because working examples are a form of guidance.
Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 25, at 641-46.
87. See infra note 143 (discussing predictable and unpredictable technologies).
88. This factor has become increasingly important over the past decade as the Federal Circuit
has compelled patentees to enable the full scope of the claimed invention. See infra note 92.
89. Enablement places an outer limit on claim scope. See sources cited supra notes 73-74.
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manipulated to modulate the enablement threshold. For example, a
PHOSITA might benefit from more teaching in a nascent technology
because there is little extant knowledge in the field to draw from. 90 This is
also true for fields where results are "uncertain, unpredictable and
unexpected."" But even in these cases where there is a high enablement
threshold, such as when "full scope" enablement is demanded,92 enablement
still has a limited teaching function. After all, requiring an inventor to
describe how to make and use what is claimed does not shed light on
mechanism. Thus, more rigorous enforcement of the statutory enablement
requirement cannot produce more informative patents.
II. PERMISSIBLE IGNORANCE IN PATENT LAW
Enriching the public storehouse of knowledge is only part of the story of
the disclosure function. There is hope that it will help achieve two broader
ends shared by patent law and science-namely, to coordinate the future
development of technology 9 3 and spur innovation.94 It would seem that
patent law could do a better job of achieving both if it encouraged inventors
to disclose mechanistic information. This Part explores rationales for patent
law's minimal disclosure paradigm and situations where it is particularly
problematic.
A. Understanding the Nondisclosure Rule
The rule that an inventor need not know mechanism has an interesting
history in patent law. Consider the 1911 Supreme Court case Diamond
Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co.95 The patent was for
"improvements in rubber tire wheels ... designed for use on ordinary
90. Chiron Corp. v. Gcnentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The law requires
an enabling disclosure for nascent technology because a person of ordinary skill in the art has little or
no knowledge independent from the patentec's instruction.").
91. Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 433 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Seymore, Heightened
Enablement, supra note 25, at 137-39.
92. The Federal Circuit has reiterated that "[c]laims arc not enabled when, at the effective filing
date of the patent, [a PHOSITA] could not practice their full scope without undue experimentation."
Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) (citing
MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). For
commentary, see Sean B. Seymore, The Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 278, 284-89 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, Enablement Pendulum] (describing the emergence of
"full scope" enablement as a "lever to invalidate patents").
93. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function ofthe Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266
(1977); see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 73, at 871.
94. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989); see also Aronson
v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (noting that one goal ofpatent law is "[to] promote[]
disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation").
95. 220 U.S. 428 (1911).
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vehicles, such as wagons, buggies, and carriages."96 The patentee's tire
became a commercial success because it had an anti-tilting feature that
distinguished it from tires in the prior art.97 But since the inventor did not
explain the scientific principles underlying the anti-tipping feature in the
patent's written description, the accused infringer argued that the patent was
invalid.98 The Court disagreed:
A patentee may be baldly empirical, seeing nothing beyond his
experiments and result . . . . It is certainly not necessary that [an
inventor] understand or be able to state the scientific principles
underlying his invention, and it is immaterial whether he can stand a
successful examination as to the speculative ideas involved. 99
Thus, an invention is patentable even if "the theory of operation is not
correctly explained or even understood."'00 All that matters is if the
disclosure is sufficiently enabling to allow a PHOSITA to practice the
invention.' 0
This nondisclosure rule explains why inventions are patentable even if
they come about unexpectedly.102 Perhaps the quintessential modern
illustration of this point is the 1999 case In re Cortright.10 3 The inventor
discovered that Bag Balm, an ointment first made in 1899 for treating
irritated cow udders,'0 4 could successfully treat baldness in humans.'0o
While the disclosure speculated as to which Bag Balm ingredient caused the
hair growth, no proof was given for the observed physiological
phenomenon. 06 Viewing the inventor's observations as inherently
suspect,1 07 the Patent Office rejected the method-of-treatment claim for
96. Id. at 430.
97. Id. at 430-33. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. An invention that is identical to or
a trivial extension of what is known in the prior art is unpatentable. See supra notes 57-60 and
accompanying text.
98. Diamond Rubber, 220 U.S. at 434.
99. Id. at 435-36.
100. Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
101. In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 463 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
102. See STUART FIRESTEIN, FAILURE: WHY SCIENCE IS SO SUCCESSFUL 44-45 (2015)
(explaining serendipitous discoveries that come from failure; that is, "[s]omething doesn't work the way
you thought it should and exploring the reasons for that leads to the initially unexpected and now
surprising result."). See generally Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185 (2009) (exploring
accidental discoveries in patent law and how they mesh with the law of invention).
103. 165 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
104. Our Heritage, BAG BALM, https://www.bagbalm.com/our-heritage [https://perma.cc/S6UJ-
REG9] (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
105. Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1355.
106. Id. at 1359.
107. The Patent Office and the courts had long regarded baldness treatments as an "inherently
unbelievable undertaking." Id. at 1357; see also In re Oberweger, 115 F.2d 826, 829 (C.C.P.A. 1940)
(affirming the Patent Office's rejection for a baldness treatment despite the inclusion of scientific
evidence because such preparations were "generally understood to be a fraud upon the public"); In re
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nonenablement.'" Writing for the court, Judge Mayer explained that the
rejection was improper because "an inventor [need not] correctly set forth,
or even know, how or why the invention works."' 0 9 It was also improper for
the Patent Office to suggest that the inventor had to offer proof for the
claimed result.'o The patent issued the following year.' with a single
claim" 2 and a written description that taught how much Bag Balm to apply
and when to expect results."1 3 But particularly relevant for present purposes,
the patent provided no information about how or why Bag Balm works." 4
B. Early Disclosure as a Justification
Early disclosure is viewed as a basic goal of the patent system.' "5 In fact,
"the patent law[s] place[] strong pressure on filing the patent application
early in the development of the technology, often before ... all of the
boundaries [are] fully explored.""'6 This incentive is even stronger under
the first-inventor-to-file regime of the America Invents Act of 2011
(AIA)." 7 For example, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP)"' instructs examiners that a drug can be patented without in vivo
Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072, 1074 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (reaching the same conclusion because baldness
treatments belonged to "a field of endeavor where 'little of a successful nature ha[d] been developed'
despite constant effort ..... ") (quoting In re Oberweger, 115 F.2d 826, 827 (C.C.P.A. 1940)); Seymore,
Patently Impossible, supra note 6, at 1514-17 (criticizing these views). But the Cortright court explained
that views have now changed and the Patent Office had granted approximately one-hundred patents for
treating baldness. Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1357.
108. Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1359.
109. Id. (quoting Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
110. Id.
Ill. See Treatment of Scalp Baldness with 8-Hydroxyquinoline Sulfate, U.S. Patent No.
6,033,676 (filed Mar. 11, 1992) (issued Mar. 7, 2000).
112. It recites "[t]he method oftreating scalp baldness with an antimicrobial to restore hair growth,
which comprises rubbing into the scalp the ointment wherein the active ingredient 8-hydroxy.quinoline
sulfate 0.3% is carried in a petrolatum and lanolin base." Id. col. 2 11. 61-66.
113. See, e.g., id. col. 2 11. 7-47 (providing working examples with three human subjects).
114. The patent merely speculates about what is going on. See id. col. 2 11. 1-4 ("It is believed that
the rubbed-in ointment offsets the effects of lower levels of male hormones in the papilla and/or provides
an antimicrobial effect on infection.") (emphasis added).
115. W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Early public
disclosure is a linchpin of the patent system."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984); Transco Prods. Inc.
v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting an interpretation of§ 112
that would "subvert the patent system's goal of . .. encouraging early disclosure"), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1151 (1995).
116. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (Newman, J., concurring) (emphasis added), rev'don other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); see also
Kitch, supra note 93, at 267-71 (explaining the rules in patent law that force and permit early filing).
117. The AIA converted the U.S. patent system from a first-to-invent regime to a first-inventor-
to-file regime. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 285-
87 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2012)) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) and
repealing 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006)). Under the AIA, the first inventor to file an application is entitled
to a patent, with some exceptions, regardless of who created the invention first. § 102(a).
118. The MPEP provides guidance to patent examiners and is entitled to judicial notice as the
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testing;"l 9 the applicant need only show a "reasonable correlation" between
the drug and its asserted therapeutic activity.1 20 Of course, this approach
encourages patent applicants to "adopt several troublesome strategies,"1 2 1
including claiming more broadly than the experimental data warrants. 122 But
inventors file early to attract investors,1 23 minimize risk,1 24 and to safeguard
patent rights in the United States and abroad. 25 This gives rise to a tradeoff
between the perceived need to race to the Patent Office with an
underdeveloped invention 2 6 and performing more pre-filing work to
produce a more robust disclosure.1 2 7
Patent Office's official interpretation of statutes and regulations. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d
1172, 1180 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The MPEP "is also made available to patent applicants and their
lawyers as well as to the general public . . . . [and] is used frequently by patent lawyers and agents in
advising applicants and in preparing their various papers for filing in the Patent Office." In re Kaghan,
387 F.2d 398, 401 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
119. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2107.03 (9th ed., rev. 08.2017) [hereinafter MPEP].
120. Id.
121. Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law's Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 884 (2017).
122. Id.
123. See JOHN SAMSON, INVENTIONS AND THEIR COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT 51 (1896) ("To
have the use of capital is nearly always indispensable for the development of an invention, and, unless
the inventor is of that fortunate class who have the means to work their own patents, he must appeal for
support to one or more people with money."); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of
Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 143-44 (2000) (discussing the role of venture
capital); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 759 (1999)
("The prospect of certainty in the patentee's property interest has several benefits, one of which is to
create a sense of security which permits the patentee to secure risk capital from investors, which in turn
facilitates the commercialization of the claimed invention.").
124. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 393 (2010) ("If
building a prototype is costly . .. the risks of not securing a patent [before actual reduction to practice]
may be too large to justify doing so.").
125. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (encouraging diligence by penalizing inventors for the delayed
filing ofpatent applications); Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065
U.N.T.S. 255, 272 (invoking an absolute novelty requirement that regards any pre-filing disclosure,
including activity by the inventor, as patent defeating).
126. In a formal sense, "[a] patent race is a race among competing firms to be the first to discover
and patent some new idea having commercial potential." WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 300 (2003). But races sometimes
encourage premature and sketchy technological disclosures in hastily-filed patent applications." Wendy
Schacht & John R. Thomas, Patent Reform: Innovation Issues, in PATENT TECHNOLOGY 1, 11 (Juanita
M. Branes ed., 2007).
127. Early filing has drawbacks. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 25, at 659-61
(arguing that ex ante incentives that encourage early filing can thwart innovation); Christopher A.
Cotropia, The Folly ofEarly Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 88-119 (2009) [hereinafter
Cotropia, Early Filing] (discussing the costs ofearly filing); Lemley, supra note 66, at 1186-87 (arguing
that the benefits of early filing are often illusory, particularly for patent applications filed by those who
have not physically made the invention).
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C. The Transparent-Opaque Invention Dichotomy
It is fair to say that whether an inventor discloses mechanistic details in
the patent only matters if a PHOSITA cannot easily elucidate the
information. Put differently, if a PHOSITA can look at an invention and
elucidate its mechanism, there is no need for the inventor to disclose that
information in the patent document.1 28  Indeed, minimal disclosure is
unobjectionable for what I define as transparent inventions-those which,
once seen, can be readily made, used, and understood. 129
To illustrate, consider a (patented) paper clip.13 0 The invention is so
simple that a drawing or commercial product is sufficient to adequately
disclose how or why it works.131 A PHOSITA who wants to understand the
physical forces involved in the friction between the wire and the paper that
cause binding could turn to readily available knowledge in the field (like a
physics textbook) to obtain this information.1 32 So asking the inventor to
disclose mechanistic details in the patent document would be redundant and
unnecessary.' 33 In sum, the invention's simplicity makes it transparent with
respect to its mechanism.134
Yet the story is quite different for more complex inventions like
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, or industrial processes. Here a drawing or
128. Similarly, if a PHOSITA can look at an invention and figure out how to make and use it,
there is no need to provide a detailed disclosure. Lawther v. Hamilton, 124 U.S. 1, 9 (1888) ("These
several steps being well known in the art when the patent was applied for, required no particular
explanation."). This is because "patents are written by and for skilled artisans." Vivid Techs., Inc. v.
Am. Sci. and Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 804 (Fed. Cir. 1999); cf S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp., 259 F.3d
1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("The law is clear that patent documents need not include subject matter
that is known in the field of the invention and is in the prior art, for patents are written for persons
experienced in the field of the invention.").
129. Transparent inventions are akin to-but not the same as-so-called "self-disclosing"
inventions. See Strandburg, supra note 43, at 105-06 (coining the term). They are defined as inventions
that are easy to replicate because reproduction is enabled by "mere commercialization." Id. at 105. In
other words, the "invention itself reveals its operation," including how to make and use it. Anderson,
supra note 42, at 1583. But a self-disclosing invention need not be transparent-that is, the invention
itself might reveal how to make and use it but not how and why it works.
130. See, e.g., Paper Clip, U.S. Patent No. 581,901 (filed Apr. 13, 1896).
131. Christopher A. Cotropia, Physicalism and Patent Theory, 69 VAND. L. REv. 1543, 1559
(2016); ef Lemley, supra note 36, at 338-39 (noting that an invention like a paper clip or a wheel is
easy to discern by evaluating the product).
132. See, e.g., JOHN MATOLYAK & AJAWAD HAIJA, ESSENTIAL PHYSICS 173-76 (2014). For
further discussion of this hypothetical, see infra notes 226-228 and accompanying text.
133. The same is true for statutory enablement. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,
802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[A] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well
known in the art."), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987); Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,
228 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that a patent "is not a sciehtific treatise, but a document
that presumes a readership skilled in the field ofthe invention"), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001); see
also Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 586 (1881) (explaining that an inventor is not required to
disclose what is already familiar to the PHOSITA).
134. This presupposes that the underlying science is easily understood. For the paper clip, Hooke's
law is the underlying scientific principle. See infra text accompanying note 227.
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physical product neither reveals how to make or use the invention nor its
mechanism-meaning that this information cannot be discerned by
inspection.' 35 And elucidating this information through reverse engineering
is difficult, if not impossible (at least without considerable effort or
expense). 13 6 I call this type of invention opaque with respect to its
mechanism.
To illustrate, consider again a patented method for treating baldness with
Bag Balm.1 3 7 Bag Balm is comprised of four ingredients-petroleum jelly,
lanolin, paraffin wax, and 8-hydroxyquinoline.138 The patent teaches that 8-
hydroxyquinoline is the active ingredient, since it is well known in the art
that petroleum jelly and lanolin do not regrow hair.13 9 But the patent
discloses nothing about how or why 8-hydroxyquinoline works. Again, such
disclosure is not required to comply with the statutory enablement
requirement.1 40 This means that a PHOSITA who wants to figure out how
or why 8-hydroxyquinoline works must engage in some experimentation-
an activity that might require a license from the patentee.14' The bottom line
is that the omitted technical information will take some effort to obtain.
Under the present disclosure paradigm, the inventor has no incentive to
figure out the invention's mechanism before filing or, for that matter, to
disclose any information other than that minimally required by the patent
statute.1 42
135. This is also true for non-self-disclosing inventions. See Lemley, supra note 36, at 338-39. It
is worth noting that, particularly in the chemical and biotech fields, sometimes an inventor can explain
how to make and use a product yet cannot identify the product by name or structure. Nevertheless, the
inventor can claim the unidentified product with a so-called "product-by-process" claim, which permits
recitation of the process by which it is made if there is no other way to define the invention. 3 CHISUM,
supra note 58, § 8.05; In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
136. Anderson, supra note 24, at 958 n.222; see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer,
The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, I ll YALE L.J. 1575, 1582-91 (2002).
137. See supra Part II.A.
138. See source cited supra note 104.
139. See '676 Patent, col. 2 11. 50-55.
140. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 11. In the hypothetical, an interested researcher could begin with experiments
on animals to avoid infringement; however, any subsequent human experimentation would probably
require a license. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787 (1876) ("[E]ach inventor is precluded from
using inventions made and patented prior to his own, except by license from the owners thereof"). But
it is worth noting that many patent owners opt not to enforce their patents against academic researchers
because ofthe high costs of detecting infringement, high litigation costs, and the low value of a potential
lawsuit. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HoUS. L. REv. 1059, 1062 (2008); cf F. Scott Kieff,
Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms ofScience-A Response to
Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 691, 705 (2001). Patentees may engage in this "rational
forbearance" of unlicensed use because "scientific norms still generate social pressure to share materials,
particularly with nonprofit entities." Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifis, and Progress in
Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 677 (2004).
142. As a general matter, "under the existing regime, patentees have every incentive to disclose
as little as possible." Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
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While the courts might require more teaching to sufficiently enable a
PHOSITA how to make and use an opaque invention than a transparent one
(particularly if the invention emerges from an unpredictable fieldl4 3 or
nascent technology),144 there is no corresponding obligation to elucidate or
disclose mechanism.1 45 Those interested in mechanism must fend for
themselves and try to figure it out. Placing this burden on the public rather
than the inventor is the principal consequence of the nondisclosure rule.
But the rule's persistence is an anomaly. Patent law is one of the most
dynamic areas of the law because it evolves as technology evolves." This
dynamism allows the patent system "to adapt flexibly to both old and new
technologies, encompassing 'anything under the sun that is made by
man."'l4 7 Maintaining the nondisclosure rule, however, evinces a one-size-
fits-all approach to transparent and opaque inventions, as they are treated
207, 209(2011) (citing R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
2135, 2150-51 (2009) (discussing factors that lead applicants to limit their disclosures)); H. JACKSON
KNIGHT, PATENT STRATEGY FOR RESEARCHERS AND RESEARCH MANAGERS 88-89 (2d ed. 2001)
(explaining how much information an inventor should disclose). Of course, the inventor could forego
patent protection altogether and opt to keep the technical information secret. See Strandburg, supra note
43, at 105-06; see also Lemley, supra note 36, at 339 ("Companies . . . who develop inventions that are
not transparent to the world, such as chemical processes and some formulas-might well decide to keep
an invention secret in the absence of legal protection.").
143. As previously discussed, enablement depends on the nature of the technology. See In re
Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988), discussed supra Part I.B. An enduring approach is to classify
a technological field as either "unpredictable" or "predictable." Scymore, Heightened Enablement, supra
note 25, at 136-39; Seymore, Enablement Pendulum, supra note 92, at 282-84. The courts refer to fields
like chemistry and biotechnology as "unpredictable" because PHOSITAs in these fields often cannot
predict whether a reaction protocol that works for one embodiment will work for others. Cedarapids,
Inc. ex rel. El-Jay Div. v. Nordberg, Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. I1, 1997)
(explaining that in the chemical arts, "a slight variation ... can yield an unpredictable result or may not
work at all"). By contrast, applied technologies like electrical and mechanical engineering are often
regarded as "predictable" because they are rooted in well-defined, predictable factors. In re Vaeck, 947
F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Of course, enablement depends on the facts in a given case because, for
example, a mechanical device can have unpredictable features. See In re Bowen, 492 F.2d 859, 861-62
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (criticizing a rigid dichotomy).
144. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The law requires
an enabling disclosure for nascent technology because a person of ordinary skill in the art has little or
no knowledge independent from the patentee's instruction.").
145. See supra Part ll.A.
146. A famous example is the removal ofjudicially-imposed limitations on patent-eligible subject
matter. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that live, genetically engineered
microorganisms are patentable after pronouncing that "Congress intended statutory [patent-eligible]
subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man."' (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979,
at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952))); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Story of Diamond v.
Chakrabarty: Technological Change and the Subject Matter Boundaries of the Patent System, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 327, 327-57 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds.,
2006). This responsiveness is not surprising because "any law[s] purporting to provide a regulatory
foundation for innovation must be able to account for both the broad range of technologies and the rapid
pace of [technological] change." R. Polk Wagner, Of Patents and Path Dependency: A Comment on
Burkand Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341, 1344 (2003).
147. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576
(2003) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309).
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similarly. The important question is whether there should be one rule that
applies to all inventions or whether patent law's disclosure function can be
improved by tailoring it to the specific attributes of different inventions. 148
III. TOWARD MECHANISTIC ENABLEMENT
All agree that disclosure of mechanism in the patent document would be
ideal-particularly for opaque inventions. 149 However, tinkering with
disclosure doctrines raises concerns about inventor behavior, the effect on
other patentability doctrines (like novelty),'o and lingering tensions in
patent law.'"' For example, requiring an inventor to disclose mechanism as
a condition for patentability could postpone filing or possibly push
inventors out of the patent system altogether.'5 2 This would give the public
a delayed disclosure, or perhaps none at all.' 53 But the de minimis statutory
enablement requirement often provides the public with a less-than-robust
disclosure.' 54 To solve this problem, this Part offers a new disclosure
paradigm.
148. Cf ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 203 (2004)
(criticizing the one-size-fits-all regime and asking "whether we should have one set of patent rules that
govern all inventions, or whether the system can be [improved] by tailoring patent rules to the specific
attributes of different technologies").
149. See discussion supra Part II.C.
150. Novelty requires that an invention be new. See supra note 56. Determining novelty requires
a comparison ofthe claimed invention with the prior art. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. One
requirement for novelty-defeating prior art is that the asserted reference could have enabled a PHOSITA
to make the invention without undue experimentation. In re Morsa, 803 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008). One might ask
if the proposed paradigm would also require that a novelty-defeating prior art reference provide
mechanistic enablement. The answer is no because, as discussed in the main text, a mechanistic
disclosure would not be a condition for patentability. See infra Part Ill.A.
151. Patent law operates as an "interdependent mix of incentives and restraints that bestow
benefits and impose costs on society" and "strives to strike a balance between the promotion of
technological invention and the dissemination of and access to its fruits." DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW I (3d ed. 2004).
152. Cf Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (arguing that limiting the scope of the claims to the specific embodiments disclosed to satisfy the
enablement requirement of§ 112 is a poor way to stimulate invention and discourages early disclosure).
See also Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 25, at 658 (discussing the effects of heightened
disclosure requirements on inventor behavior).
153. Recall that the public gets detailed knowledge about the invention as soon as the patent
document publishes. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Patent documents include issued patents
and published patent applications. Since 1999, most patent applications publish eighteen months after
the earliest effective filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2012). Once a patent application publishes,
the information it discloses is considered publicly known. See id. § 102.
154. For illustrations, see supra text accompanying notes 4-7; Part II.A.
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A. New Disclosure Paradigm
Perhaps the biggest roadblock to robust disclosures is the one-size-fits-
all nature of the patent system.' 55 For example, an inventor who satisfies the
how-to-make and how-to-use prongs of the enablement requirement of
§ 112(a) is entitled to a patent.1 5 6 Whether to go beyond the statutory
requirements and disclose additional information-such as mechanism-is
a bit more complicated. On one hand, additional disclosure has several
upsides for the inventor. For example, it can aid in compliance with the
written description requirement of § 112(a).' Additional disclosure can
also create patent-defeating prior art against others.' For example, such
disclosure might render future claims obvious to try.'1" On the other hand,
if the inventor plans to seek one or more subsequent improvement patents,' 6 0
that is a reason to disclose as little as possible in the initial patent to avoid
creating prior art against oneself.16 1 Thus, the decision to provide additional
155. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
156. The introductory clause of§ 102 of Title 35 of the Patent Act states that "[a] person shall be
entitled to a patent unless .... " 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). This creates a presumption of patentability.
Seymore, Presumption, supra note 25, at 997-1014; see also FTC REPORT, supra note 69, at 9 ("[T]he
courts have interpreted the patent statute to require the [Patent Office] to grant a patent application unless
the [Patent Office] can establish that the claimed invention does not meet one or more ofthe patentability
criteria. Once an application is filed, the claimed invention is effectively presumed to warrant a patent
unless the [Patent Office] can prove otherwise.").
157. "Written description" has two meanings in patent law. First, it refers to the descriptive part
of the patent document. See supra note 29. Second, it refers to the patentability requirement that the
patent document "objectively demonstrate that the applicant actually invented-was in possession of-
the claimed subject matter." Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc). The written description requirement is related to, but separate from, enablement. Id. at 1351.
158. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 2175, 2175-76 (2000) (discussing a research organization's strategic incentive to create prior art);
Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926, 927 (2000) (same); Bill Barrett,
Defensive Use of Publications in an Intellectual Property Strategy, 20 NATURE BIOTECH. 191, 191-93
(2002) (providing specific drafting strategies for creating prior art).
159.
An 'obvious-to-try' situation exists when a general disclosure may pique the scientist's
curiosity, such that further investigation might be done as a result of the disclosure, but the
disclosure itself does not contain a sufficient teaching of how to obtain the desired result, or
that the claimed result would be obtained if certain directions were pursued.
In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 421 (2007) ("[T]hat a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under §
103.").
160. An improvement patent is a patent that (as the name implies) improves on an invention
disclosed and claimed in an earlier patent. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 18-19 (5th ed. 2016).
Such patents are explicitly authorized by statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.") (emphasis added).
161. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) & (b)(1) (rendering an invention unpatentable if it was disclosed more
than one year before the filing of the patent application). For a discussion of more upsides to disclosing
as little as possible, see supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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disclosure involves tradeoffs.
Mindful of these tradeoffs, I propose a new disclosure paradigm to
induce the elucidation and ultimate disclosure of mechanism in patent
documents. The statutory enablement requirement would remain
unchanged-disclosure of how to make and use the invention would be
sufficient to obtain a patent.162 Optionally disclosing how or why the
invention works would constitute what I define as mechanistic enablement.
The term mechanism comes from the realm of the experimental sciences,
where it refers to a detailed picture of how a result is obtained.163
Of course, inventors might be reluctant to provide mechanistic
enablement. Aside from the reasons noted above, inventors may balk at the
additional experimentation required-or, if the information is known, may
want to keep it secret.' 6 4 To overcome these hurdles, the next two sections
describe ways to get mechanistic enablement.
B. Inducing Disclosure with Broadened Claim Scope
Claims are central to every aspect of patent law. 165 They define the
"technological territory" that the inventor claims is his or hers to control1 6 6
and "provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on
the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected
invention." 67 So patentees will seek the broadest claim scope possible.1 68
But claim scope is closely tied to the amount of information that the
applicant discloses in the patent application. The principal constraint on
claim scope is enablement-the claim scope sought must be commensurate
with the amount of enablement provided.' 6 9 This aligns with the quid pro
quo theory of patents previously discussed: the inventor must give more
162. For a discussion of statutory enablement, see supra Part I.B.
163. See, e.g., JOHN W. MOORE & RALPH G. PEARSON, KINETICS AND MECHANISM 2-3 (3d ed.
1981) (defining mechanism as a description of the processes involved (including atoms, molecules,
individual steps) to produce an overall reaction); JAMES A. COWAN, INORGANIC BIOCHEMISTRY 24 (2d
ed. 1997) ("A reaction mechanism is a detailed picture of the way reactant species are turned into
products. . . .") (emphasis omitted).
164. See supra notes 24 and 142.
165. Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning ofPatent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REv. 101,
101 (2005); see also Giles S. Rich, The Extent ofthe Protection and Interpretation ofClaims-American
Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990) (stating that in patent law,
"the name of the game is the claim"). At the application stage the inventor "dicker[s] with the [Patent
Office] to obtain an expansive exclusory right; and in litigation the parties try to convince the court to
construe the claims in their favor." Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 25, at 128-29.
166. Merges & Nelson, supra note 73, at 844.
167. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
168. Merges & Nelson, supra note 73, at 840; ANTHONY L. MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY 98 (2001)
(arguing that applicants have an incentive "to obtain very broad claims for which a colorable argument
can be made for patentability").
169. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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(information about the invention) to get more (claim scope).17 o Below I
describe how mechanistic enablement can make it easier for applicants to
obtain broader claims.
1. Enabling Generic Claims
The broadest scope of patent protection is obtained with generic
claims."' These are claims which use functional language or generic
formulas to cover embodiments of the invention that share a common
attribute.' 72 For example, consider a claim to a plastic-coated steel screw.1 7 3
Given that there are thousands of different plastics,' 74  the claim
encompasses a genus of thousands of embodiments.'17  And since patent law
does not require an inventor to actually make each embodiment claimed, 17 6
generic claiming can afford broad claim scope with relatively little
experimentation. 177
Although generic claims appear in all areas of technology,' 78 they are
ubiquitous in the chemical and pharmaceutical arts.1 7 9 In these fields a
typical generic claim has a core generic chemical structure with an array of
variables appended to it-which can each represent countless chemical
moieties.' When the number of variables on the core chemical structure is
170. See discussion supra Part 1.
171. Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 25, at 145-46.
172. See MPEP, supra note 119, § 806.04(d) (defining a generic claim).
173. Cf Coated Metal Fastener, U.S. Patent No. 4,964,774 (filed Sept. 29, 1989).
174. Mohammed Alauddin et al., Plastics and Their Machining: A Review, 54 J. MATERIALS
PROCESSING TECH. 40, 40 (1995).
175. These include steel screws coated with nylon, polystyrene, polyvinyl chloride, etc. '774
Patent.
176. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (explaining that "the word 'invention' in
the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor's conception rather than to a physical embodiment
of that idea"); Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The mere fact that something
has not previously been done clearly is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for rejecting all applications
purporting to disclose how to do it." (quoting In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 461 (C.C.P.A. 1956))).
177. For criticisms, see Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 25, at 145-54; Seymore,
Teaching Function, supra note 25, at 628-32.
178. See, e.g., LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (determining that a generic claim covering methods of digital image compression technology
which taught a single method did not enable the entire claimed genus).
179. See Lucille J. Brown, The Markush Challenge, 31 J. CHEMICAL INFO. COMPUTER SCt. 2-3
(1991) (discussing the widespread use of generic structures in chemical patents and the broad protection
they convey); Ned A. Israelson & Rose M. Thiessen, Chemical and Pharmaceutical Patents, in
DRAFTING PATENTS FOR LITIGATION AND LICENSING 603, 603 (Bradley C. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2008)
(advising drafters of chemical patent applications to provide adequate support for claims that often
covers billions of species).
180. See In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1249 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (explaining that the practice of
describing a class of chemical compounds in terms of structural formulas, where the substituents are
recited in the claim language, has been sanctioned by the courts). This style of claiming-ubiquitous in
the chemical and pharmaceutical arts-is called Markush practice. A Markush claim is an alternative
claim format that allows an applicant to define a genus or subgenus by enumeration of species. See In
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large, and the number of possible chemical moieties is also large, the
number of species encompassed by the generic claim can be millions,'8 '
billions,182 or more. 183
The breadth of generic claims brings enablement's commensurability
requirement to the fore.1 84 Recall that the basic premise of generic claiming
is that the enablement of a few species can be extrapolated across the entire
claimed genus.18' But this premise is often dubious. In unpredictable fields,
extrapolation often cannot be done with a reasonable expectation of
success. 8 6 And when a generic claim covers millions of embodiments,
enablement across the entire genus becomes particularly suspect. 181 It is the
lack of commensurability-the inability to enable the entire genus-that
makes generic claims vulnerable to rejection (or narrowing) at the
application stage or invalidation in litigation. 8 8
re Harnisch, 631 F.2d 716, 719-20 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (explaining the history and current law of Markush
practice).
181. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,801,613 (filed June 17, 1987). Claim I recites "[a] modified
bradykinin type peptide having the formula A-Arg-B-C-D-W-X-Y-Z-Arg," wherein A, B, C, D, W,
X, Y, Z are each generic substructures reciting smaller peptides or amino acids. Thus, the primary
generic structure contains eight smaller generic substructures. See id. col. 19 1. 21-37. Altogether, this
claim covers 10,235,904 formulations of a peptide.
182. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,838,925 (filed Sept. 25, 1987) (including a broad generic claim
which covers billions of compounds).
183. For an extreme example, see U.S. Patent No. 5,422,351 (filed June 21, 1991) (including a
structural formula in claim I which encompasses at least one novemdecillion (which is ten followed by
sixty zeroes) chemical compounds).
184. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
185. See In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993); cf AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344
F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("That is not to say that the specification itself must necessarily
describe how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, for the [PHOSITA's]
knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate between
embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments, depending upon the
predictability of the art.").
186. Wright, 999 F.3d at 1564 (analyzing enablement by determining if a PHOSITA would have
believed that the inventor's success with the described embodiment(s) "could be extrapolated with a
reasonable expectation of success" to other embodiments covered by the genus claim); see also In re
Prutton, 200 F.2d 706, 712 (C.C.P.A. 1952) (holding that claims to a class of chemical compounds,
which were broad enough to require speculation, lacked enablement even though specific working
examples were provided).
187. As explained by one commentator:
Generic structures are allowed under the premise that a compound as a whole will exhibit
specific activity regardless ofwhat is substituted on the basic molecule. Clearly, where variable
structure represents greater than three or four or ten million compounds, it is unreasonable to
expect that so many compounds will exhibit activity similar to the activity shown by substances
for which practical data is supplied.
Brown, supra note 179, at 3. But enablement is not all about numbers. Sometimes an inventor can be
hard pressed to enable a very small genus. A famous example is In re Soil, 97 F.2d 623 (C.C.P.A. 1938),
where the court affirmed the Patent Office's determination that a single working example of one member
of a well-defined group of four chemical compounds was insufficient to enable the four-member genus.
Id. at 625. Neither knowledge in the art nor any teachings in the patent document suggested that the
other three members of the genus would react similarly to yield the claimed result. Id. at 624.
188. Commensurability is receiving more attention now that the Federal Circuit is insisting on full
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Mechanistic enablement could totally change the commensurability
calculus. I contend that an extrapolation argument is more plausible if the
inventor can articulate the underlying mechanism that ties everything in the
claimed genus together.
2. Illustrations
Traditional considerations for determining whether an inventor is
entitled to a generic claim include "the type[s] of reactions, the state of the
art, the representative nature of the examples, and the breadth of the
claim[]."'89 In the illustrations that follow, I show how providing
mechanistic enablement can make it easier for applicants to obtain broad
generic claims.
a. Opaque Generic Claims
A generic claim covering an opaque invention is expansive in scope but
covers subject matter where the mechanism cannot be readily discerned.1 90
Good examples are inventions emerging from unpredictable fields like
chemistry and pharmacology.1 9' As previously discussed, these claims are
particularly susceptible to enablement problems.' 92 I contend that
mechanistic enablement can bolster statutory enablement and render these
claims patentable.
To illustrate, I build upon the stomach ulcer hypothetical presented in the
Introduction. 93 Suppose the inventor discovered how to treat the disease by
administering penicillin to affected individuals.' 94 While the inventor can
describe how to provide a therapeutically effective dosage and disclose data
from successful use in human subjects, the inventor does not know how or
why penicillin works.
The inventor files a patent application which discloses the
aforementioned information and contains the following claim matrix:
1. A method of treating peptic ulcer disease comprising administering
scope enablement. See supra note 92.
189. In re Rainer, 377 F.2d 1006, 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
190. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 143.
192. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
193. See supra Introduction (second paragraph).
194. See Xavier Calvet, Helicobacter pylori Infection: Treatment Options, 73 (Supp. 1)
DIGESTION 119, 119 (2006) (discussing an older treatment involving penicillin). Now the typical initial
course of therapy includes combinations of 2-3 antibiotics with a proton pump inhibitor. Id. at 120;
William D. Chey et al., ACG Clinical Guideline: Treatment ofHelicobacter pylori Infection, 112 AM. J.
GASTROENTEROLOGY 212, 219-25 (2017).
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a therapeutically effective amount of a beta-lactam antibiotic.
2. A method of treating peptic ulcer disease comprising administering
a therapeutically effective amount of a penam antibiotic.
3. A method of treating peptic ulcer disease comprising administering
a therapeutically effective amount of penicillin.
This is a typical claim drafting strategy for a generic invention."' Claim 1
is the broadest and covers the genus of antibiotics containing a beta-lactam
ring in their structures.19 6 It covers thousands of compounds.1 97 Claim 2 is
narrower and covers a subgenus-here "penam" refers to the subclass of
beta-lactam antibiotics that share a common bicyclic chemical structure but
differ in the appended functional groups.1 98 Claim 3, the narrowest claim,
covers the single embodiment (penicillin) for which work was actually
performed. '9 In this claim matrix the narrowest claim is almost certainly
enabled, whereas the broadest claim is most susceptible to enablement
attack.200
To begin, consider what happens if mechanistic details are not disclosed.
The question is whether a PHOSITA is sufficiently enabled to practice the
full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation. 2 0 1 A
Wands analysis 20 2 reveals that the answer is probably yes for claim 3 but no
for claims 1 and 2. The principal issues are the technical scope and
substance of the disclosure (factors one and two), the nature of the
technology (factors three and four), the PHOSITA's knowledge and skill
(factor five), and the scope of the claim sought (factor seven). 203 That the
underlying science is complex and unpredictable means that the patent
document must provide the PHOSITA with considerable guidance because
195. See MPEP, supra note 119, § 608.01(m) (instructing applicants to draft claims so that the
first claim presented is the broadest in scope); Jason Rantanen, The Malleability ofPatent Rights, 2015
MICH. ST. L. REV. 895, 944 (2015) ("Patents rarely contain just a single broad or narrow claim, but
rather consist of a series of broad and narrow claims . . . .").
196. See Derek J. Hook, Production ofAntibiotics by Fermentation, in BASIC BIOTECHNOLOGY
433, 435 (Colin Ratledge & Bjorn Kristiansen eds., 3d ed. 2006).
197. See Karen Bush & Patricia A. Bradford, /-Lactams and fi-Lactamase Inhibitors: An
Overview, COLD SPRING HARBOR PERSP. MED., Aug. 1, 2016, at 1 (2016).
198. See Hook, supra note 196, at 436.
199. The narrowest claim typically covers a specific embodiment, perhaps a product that the
patentee is selling to the public. JANICE M. MUELLER, MUELLER ON PATENT LAW: PATENTABILITY AND
VALIDITY 2-36 (2012); JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION 6-77 to -78
(2005).
200. Cf Rantanen, supra note 195, at 944 (explaining that claims typically "funnel down from the
broad and more likely invalid, to the narrow .. . but more likely valid").
201. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
202. See discussion supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
203. See discussion supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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of a lack of extant knowledge in the field. 204 Here the inventor provides
actual experimental information about one embodiment-penicillin itself-
which is sufficient to enable the species claim (claim 3). But there is no
reason to believe that a PHOSITA could take the teaching from that single
embodiment and extrapolate it across the entire penam subgenus (claim 2)
or beta-lactam genus (claim 1) with a reasonable expectation of success.
Thus, claims 1 and 2 are nonenabled.
But the story is quite different if the inventor provides mechanistic
enablement. Suppose that after the initial breakthrough, the inventor
engages in additional experimentation and identifies Helicobacterpylori as
the bacteria involved.205 It becomes clear that penicillin interferes with
bacterial cell-wall synthesis and other cellular functions, causing the cell to
degrade. 206 The inventor discloses this mechanistic information in the patent
document.
This mechanistic information does two things. First, it provides the
public with a very detailed disclosure-one that truly fulfills the bargained-
for exchange justifying the patent grant.207 Second, it allows the inventor to
persuasively make the case for broad claim scope. For example, consider
claim 2. Applying the aforementioned multifactor test,208 it may be that the
types of reactions involved, the state of the art of penam chemistry, the
representative nature of the example(s) disclosed, and the number of penam
antibiotics claimed-when viewed in light of the mechanistic enablement
provided-justify a claim covering the entire subgenus. This is because
mechanistic enablement fills a knowledge gap and allows a PHOSITA to
extrapolate the teachings of work actually performed across the entire
subgenus with a reasonable expectation of success. 2 09 As for claim 1 (the
genus claim), the inventor could plausibly get some of its scope-bearing
in mind that it covers thousands of compounds! 210 The bottom line is that
mechanistic enablement can bolster statutory enablement-allowing the
inventor to obtain considerably broader claim scope than would have been
possible without it.
204. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
205. See M. Varbanova et al., Helicobacter pylori and Other Gastric Bacteria, 29 DIGESTIVE
DISEASES 562, 562 (2011) ("The dogma of the stomach being a sterile organ has been turned down by
the discovery of Helicobacter pylori."). Scientific consensus of Helicobacter pylori as a cause of
stomach ulcers came in 1994. See id. at 563-64.
206. Hongbaek Cho et al., Beta-Lactam Antibiotics Induce a Lethal Malfunctioning of the
Bacterial Cell Wall Synthesis Machinery, 159 CELL 1300, 1300-11 (2014).
207. See discussion supra Part I.A.
208. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
209. See In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
210. See Bush & Bradford, supra note 197, at 1.
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b. Transparent Generic Claims
A generic claim covering a transparent invention is expansive in scope
but covers subject matter in which the mechanism can be readily
discerned.21 ' So this type of invention teaches its own mechanism.212 To
illustrate, consider the following hypothetical example based on the paper
clip previously discussed.213 Suppose that in 2013 an inventor identifies a
problem with the standard paper clip 2 14 : only one end of the clip can be used
to clip sheets of paper together. 215 A user must first determine the attachable
end of the clip and align the paper accordingly. This adds time and effort
and makes paper handling cumbersome. 216 To solve this problem, the
inventor develops a double-ended paper clip; that is, "an improved paper
clip which is provided with an extra loop of wire so that the clip can be used
from either end to attach papers together." 217 The inventor files a patent
application with drawings, a written description disclosing how to make and
use the clip, and a single claim:
1. A new and improved paper clip having first and second ends, said
first end including first and second internested loops positionable on
opposed sides of said paper, said second end including third and
fourth internested loops positionable on opposed sides of said paper,
whereby said first or second end of said paper clip facilitates a
conventional use thereof. . . .2 1 8
Since the claim language does not limit the invention to a particular size or
composition of clip,2 19 it broadly covers clips of various sizes and
compositions.22 0
Demonstrating statutory enablement would be easy for this type of
invention. The key Wands factors are the nature of the invention, the
211. See supra text accompanying note 134.
212. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
213. See discussion supra Part ll.C (second paragraph). The facts are loosely based on Time
Saving Paper Clips, U.S. Patent No. 5,170,535 col. 1 11. 17-28 (filed Feb. 4, 1992) (issued Dec. 15,
1992).
214. The classic "Gem" paper clip was never patented, but the machine for making the clip was
patented. See Machine for Making Wire Paper Clips, U.S. Patent No. 636,272 (filed Apr. 27, 1899)
(issued Nov. 7, 1899). The patent also discloses a picture of the clip.,Id. at Fig. 2.
215. '535 Patent col. 1 11. 17-19.
216. Id. at col. 1 11. 23-25.
217. Id. col. 1. 11. 43-45 (emphasis added).
218. Cf id. col. 4 11. 60-66.
219. Many patents explicitly include broadening language in the written description to support
broad claim scope. See, e.g., id. col. 4 11. 52-56 ("[I]t is not desired to limit the invention to the exact
construction and operation shown and described, and accordingly, all suitable modifications and
equivalents may be resorted to, falling within the scope of the invention.").
220. Thus, the claim covers metal clips, plastic clips, small clips, large clips, etc.
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PHOSITA's level of skill, the predictability of the field, and the teaching
provided. 22 1 First, it stands to reason that the PHOSITA's required level of
skill for this type of rudimentary mechanical invention would be minimal. 2 22
Second, the field is predictable-meaning that the underlying technology is
governed by well-defined, predictable scientific principles. 2 2 3 Thus, a
PHOSITA can rely on knowledge in the field and the teaching provided in
the patent document to make a broad range of paper clips, including those
not explicitly described or exemplified. 2 24 Third, because of the nature of
the invention, the PHOSITA's knowledge, and the field's predictability, the
inventor need only provide a minimal amount of teaching to enable the
broad claim scope sought. 225
Because the invention is transparent to its inner workings-springiness
and elasticity of the clip bind the paper-it provides its own mechanistic
enablement. 226 A PHOSITA who wants to understand the physics involved
could turn to readily available knowledge in the field to obtain this
information:
What ... makes the paperclip do its job is springiness; or rather the
force exerted on the papers that results from the paperclip's spring
action. [The material of which the paperclip is made] has a
characteristic springiness or elasticity. Its elastic behavior is
described by Hooke's law ... F = -kX, where F denotes force, X
221. For a discussion of the Wands factors, see supra Part LB.
222. Cf Exparte Schnak, 2012 WL 3767506, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 23, 2012) ("[D]esigning and
constructing vents in a polymer shell or cover would likely require little if any experimentation- [sic]
the nature of the invention and relative level of skill in the art appear to require no more than technician-
level assistance.").
223. See supra note 143 and cases cited therein.
224. The scope of enablement is the sum of what is taught in the patent document and the
PHOSITA's preexisting knowledge. Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166
F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538, 543 (C.C.P.A. 1973) ("Every
patent application . . . relies to some extent upon knowledge of persons skilled in the art to complement
that disclosed in order that it be 'enabling' within the meaning of§ 112.").
225. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("That is not to say that the
specification itself must necessarily describe how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed
invention, for the [PHOSITA's] knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill
gaps, interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed
embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art."). But see ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms.,
LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940-41 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("[Tihe rule that a specification need not disclose what is
well known in the art is merely a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling
disclosure .... To satisfy the plain language of § 112, P 1, [an applicant] ... cannot simply rely on the
knowledge of [the PHOSITA] to serve as a substitute for the missing information in the specification."
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
226. "As to the explanation of how this paperelip works, Figure 5 [in the patent] says most of it .
.JEROEN DE RIDDER, RECONSTRUCTING DESIGN, EXPLAINING ARTIFACTS: PHILOSOPHICAL DESIGN
AND EXPLANATION OF TECHNICAL ARTIFACTS 164 (Anthonie Meijers & Peter Kroes eds., 4 SIMON
STEVIN SERIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 2007) (citing Paper Clip, U.S. Patent No.
1,985,866 (filed Nov. 23, 1933) (issued Dec. 25, 1934)).
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extension, and k an object's elasticity constant. Up to a material's
elastic limit, the more we stretch something, the more resistance it
offers to further stretching. Beyond this limit permanent deformation
occurs. This is the key to paperclip behavior: flexing the loops out of
their normal plane position causes them to exert a force in the
opposite direction, and thus they hold the sheets of paper together.227
Thus, there is no need for the inventor to provide mechanistic details. And
since a PHOSITA can readily extrapolate beyond the disclosed
embodiment(s) to make clips of various sizes and compositions (and apply
the aforementioned knowledge in the field to figure out what materials
would work and which ones would not),22 8 the inventor should be afforded
broad claim scope (in this case, a genus of paper clips of various materials
and sizes).
C. Reinvigorating an Absolute Experimental Use Privilege
A patent gives its owner "the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States."2 29 Engaging in any of these
activities without authority during the patent term constitutes patent
infringement.2 30 However, the courts have long recognized a limitation to
the right to exclude known as the experimental use exception.23 ' This
common-law privilege exempts an accused infringer's making or using of
the invention from potential infringement liability if the activities are
performed solely for experimental or non-commercial purposes.2 32
227. Id.
228. See supra note 225.
229. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
230. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012); see also Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858,
861 (Fed. Cit. 1984) ("Section 271(a) prohibits, on its face, any and all uses of a patented invention."),
superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1994), as recognized in Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110
F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
231. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03. The defense can be traced back to an
1813 opinion by Justice Story, where he wrote that "it could never have been the intention of the
legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or
for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects."
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). The law evolved until
it became "well-settled, that an experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of gratifying a -
philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the
patentee." Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).
232. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03. As explained by the noted patent
scholar William Robinson in his famous treatise:
[When the invention] is made or used as an experiment, whether for the gratification of
scientific tastes, or for curiosity, or for amusement, the interests of the patentee are not
antagonized, the sole effect being ofan intellectual character in the promotion of the employer's
knowledge or the relaxation afforded to his mind. But if the products of the experiment are
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At its core, the experimental use exception is all about generating
scientific knowledge.233 Importantly for this Article, it promotes
investigation to better understand the invention-including mechanism. 2 3 4
If the patent lacks this information, the exception permits experimentation
to obtain it during the patent term.2 35 Thus, the exception promotes the
patent system's goal of rapid knowledge dissemination. 2 36
Yet, despite the exception's solid grounding in patent policy, the Federal
Circuit has become hostile to the experimental use exception.2 37 The key
case is Madey v. Duke University,23 8 which explored the applicability of the
exception to academic research. 239 The court held that even if the accused
infringer's purpose is not commercial in nature, "so long as the act is in
furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not solely
for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry,
the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental
use defense." 240
But a narrow experimental use exception does not align with patent law's
disclosure function 2 4 1 and hinders elucidating mechanistic enablement.2 42
sold, or used for the convenience of the experimentor, or if the experiments are conducted with
a view to the adaptation of the invention to the experimentor's business, the acts of making or
of use are violations of the rights of the inventor and infringements of his patent.
3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 898, at 56 (Bos.: Little,
Brown, & Co. 1890).
233. The experimental use exemption means that "a patentee will not be allowed to prevent
experimentation using a patented product or process for bona fide research activities designed to further
scientific knowledge." Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System
and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REv. 1051, 1073 (1988).
234. Notice of Hearings and Request for Comments on Issues Relating to Patent Protection for
Therapeutic and Diagnostic Methods, 61 Fed. Reg. 10320, 10322 (Mar. 13, 1996).
235. See supra notes 231-232 and accompanying text.
236. Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption fom United States Patent
Infringement Liability: Implications fbr University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56
BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 921 (2004).
237. See, e.g., Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader,
J., concurring) ("[1]n my judgment, the Patent Act leaves no room for any de minimis or experimental
use excuses for infringement.").
238. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
239. Id. at 1362.
240. Id. It is worth noting that philosophical inquiry is an outdated term synonymous with the
modern scientific experiment. Mueller, supra note 236, at 929.
241. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1989) (arguing that certain experimental uses should
not give rise to infringement liability because "[i]fthe public had absolutely no right to use the disclosure
without the patent holder's consent until after the patent expired, it would make little sense to require
that the disclosure be made freely available to the public at the outset of the patent term."); Fromer,
supra note 66, at 558 n.93 (arguing that without the exception, the patent's disclosure is "practically
unusable" until the end of the patent term).
242. Consider the views of Judge Newman, who has openly criticized the Federal Circuit's
evisceration of the experimental use exception:
The patent statute requires full disclosure of the invention, including details of enabling
experiments and technical drawings . . .. Such details would be idle and purposeless if this
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Kathy Strandburg explains that "when there is no exception for
experimentation aimed at a more complete understanding of the patented
invention, there is an incentive for patentees to provide a bare minimum of
disclosure to satisfy a patent examiner ... ."243 And "for scientists and
engineers, understanding is often, if not virtually always, a hands-on
experience" 2" that requires a detailed physical exploration of how the
"[p]ublished results . .. were obtained and to explore their limitations and
features not presented in the published description [in the patent
document]."24 5 Timothy Holbrook concisely sums up the problem:
The absence of an effective experimental use defense severely limits
the ability of the patent disclosure to "teach" anything. One can read
the patent but cannot make or use the invention for purposes of
exploring its function or the manner in which it works. Unless the
courts or Congress create a more robust experimental use defense,
the ability of the patent disclosure to teach anything of worth to the
public is curtailed.2 46
These views align with the overwhelming weight of academic opinion.2 47
My view is that the courts or Congress should create an absolute
experimental use defense for third parties who make or use a patented
invention to elucidate mechanistic details. There would be no patent
infringement liability-even if the underlying research project ultimately
becomes part of a commercialization effort-as long as the technical
information cannot be used for 17-20 years. Indeed, there would be little value in the
requirement of the patent law that patented information must be removed from secrecy in
consideration of the patent right to exclude, if the information is then placed on ice and
protected from further study and research investigation. To the contrary, the patent system both
contemplates and facilitates research into patented subject matter, whether the purpose is
scientific understanding or evaluation or comparison or improvement. Such activities are
integral to the advance of technology.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
243. Strandburg, supra note 43, at 102 (emphasis added).
244. Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
245. Id.
246. Holbrook, Possession, supra note 66, at 140 (emphasis added).
247. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 236, at 975-77 (arguing that Madey hinders improving on
earlier inventions and, consequently, hinders technological progress); Ted Hagelin, The Experimental
Use Exemption to Patent Infingement: Information on Ice, Competition on Hold, 58 FLA. L. REV. 483,
512-13 (2006) (explaining that a narrow experimental use exception retards innovation, competition,
and consumer welfare and interferes with other policy goals of the patent system); Rochelle Dreyfuss,
Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense A rrived?, 46
ARIZ. L. REv. 457, 457 (2004) (advocating in the wake of Madey and related cases a "new experimental
use defense to maintain a robust, creative environment for modern science and biotechnology"). But see
Alan Devlin, Restricting Experimental Use, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 626-32 (2009) (arguing
that experimental use strips the patentee of the right to exclude).
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knowledge has been or is on a trajectory toward public disclosure. 248 The
burden of proving the defense in patent litigation would rest on the
defendant.2 49
I bolster my proposal by drawing a parallel to the statutory use defense
of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). While the Patent Act does not recognize a general
statutory exemption for experimental use, Congress added a safe-harbor
provision as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 to permit the use of a
patented invention "solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . ."20 In Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd.25 ' the Supreme Court broadly interpreted this exemption
to include upstream research (including that conducted by pioneer drug
manufacturers) involving the preclinical use of patented inventions.2 5 2 This
includes the use of patented compounds for experiments on drugs that fail
and are not ultimately the subject of a submission to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).2 53 So while the statutory safe harbor does not
(directly) concern mechanistic information, it does reveal that the Court and
Congress are willing to create an absolute experimental use exception for a
clear purpose-to generate information reasonably related to regulatory
approval.
My ultimate purpose for reinvigorating the experimental use exception
is to incentivize knowledge dissemination.254 I hope that the mere existence
of the defense will encourage inventors to elucidate mechanism and disclose
that information in the patent document. In this circumstance the defense
would be unavailable. But if the inventor does not disclose mechanism in
the patent, another researcher would be privileged to ascertain and
ultimately disclose that information. Either way, the public would get a
detailed disclosure.
248. For example, a university researcher might publish the details in a peer-reviewed publication.
See infra note 296 and accompanying text. The defense would be available even if the article has not
published by the time an infringement suit is docketed (but the manuscript is in preparation or under
review).
249. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
250. See Drug Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act, Pub. L. No.
98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012)).
251. 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
252. Id. at 202-06.
253. Id. at 205-08.
254. See supra note 233.
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D. Complications
1. Difficult-to-Understand Inventions
Some inventions are difficult to understand. I address this issue in more
detail in Part IV;255 for now, I acknowledge that sometimes attempts to
elucidate mechanism may lead to dead ends, mystery, and frustration.256 To
be sure, the scientific community recognizes that some things cannot be
understood.257 This may explain why the nondisclosure rule proliferates: If
disclosing an invention's mechanism were a condition of patentability, then
difficult-to-understand inventions might never be disclosed or patented.258
Such a requirement would, of course, interfere with the patent system's
goals of discouraging secrecy, 2 5 9 preventing duplicative research, 260 and
promoting early disclosure. 2 6 1
But recall that mechanistic enablement would not be a condition for
patentability. 26 2 If elucidation of the invention's mechanism proves (or
seems) futile, for generic claims the status quo would apply-the inventor
would need to articulate a non-mechanistic rationale to justify broad
scope. 263 As for the experimental use defense, third parties who made a bona
fide attempt to elucidate an elusive mechanism could still assert it.26
2. Risky Disclosures
The mechanistic enablement paradigm presupposes that generating more
knowledge about the invention-and the eventual disclosure of that
255. See infra Part IV.C.
256. To illustrate, consider acetaminophen, the popular pain reliever first used clinically in 1894.
Despite its popularity, researchers have bccn "guessing" at the drug's mechanism for decades with no
proposal accumulating sufficient evidence to gain a scientific consensus. Carmen Drahl, How Does
Acetaminophen Work: Researchers Still Aren't Sure, CHEMICAL & ENG'G NEWS, July 21, 2014, at 31,[https://perma.cc/C4T6-2LNP].
257. STUART FIRESTEIN, IGNORANCE: How IT DRIVES SCIENCE 35 (2012); see also Sarah Boxer,
Science Confronts The Unknowable: Less Is Known Than People Think, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1998, at
B7. Perhaps the most famous example is the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, which states that one can
never know both the position and momentum of a subatomic particle simultaneously. Id.; FIRESTEIN,
supra, at 35-37.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 151-152.
259. For a comprehensive discussion, see Anderson, supra note 24, at 922-35.
260. See Fromer, supra note 66, at 548-50 (explaining that the patent system's ability to
discourage duplicative research is one reason why the system can achieve its goal of stimulating
innovation); Parchomovsky, supra note 158, at 946 (noting that "duplicative research expenditures" are
socially "wasteful in the aggregate"); cf Kitch, supra note 93, at 276 (explaining that inadequate
disclosure by the first inventor leads to wasteful investigation by subsequent researchers).
261. See discussion supra Part II.B.
262. See supra Part III.A.
263. See discussion supra Part IlI.B. L
264. See supra Part Ill.C.
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knowledge-is a win-win-win for the patentee, society, and the patent
system. For the patentee, mechanistic enablement would justify broad claim
scope 265 by bolstering statutory enablement2 66 and the closely-related
written description requirement. 267 For society, mechanistic enablement
would provide more detailed disclosures (which, in turn, would prevent
duplicative research efforts and foster more creative activity during the
patent term). 268 Finally, mechanistic enablement would allow the patent
system to better fulfill its goals of promoting technological progress.26 9
But there are several reasons why an inventor may resist disclosing
mechanism-even if known. First, as previously discussed, an inventor may
want to retain a competitive edge. 270 Second, an inventor might fear
uncovering potentially harmful information. For example, elucidating how
or why a drug works could reveal that it is unsafe.2 71 Such information could
devalue the patent or jeopardize FDA approval.272 Third, there is a fear that
characterizing an invention or added discussion about it could limit claim
scope.273
While I acknowledge these risks, I reiterate that the proposed paradigm
would not compel disclosure of mechanistic information.2 74 The inventor
would have to weigh the benefits and risks of (non)disclosure, bearing in
mind the experimental use defense.2 75
265. See discussion supra Part IlI.B.
266. For an illustration, see supra Part 11l.B.2(a).
267. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 49 and 260 and accompanying text.
269. See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 24 and 142; Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs,
73 AM. ECON. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 267, 267 (1983) (discussing the strategy from an economic
perspective).
271. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 345, 370 (2007).
272. Sherkow, supra note 121, at 901.
273. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (reaffirming
the importance of the written description in claim construction); Benjamin Hattenbach et al., Patent
Prosecution Pitfalls: Perspectives from the Trenches of Litigation, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 340, 341 (2010) (explaining that the decisionmaker "will scrutinize the patent, often dissecting
nearly every word," as the patent's written description "will be used as a roadmap for understanding the
invention, and will be carefully examined for statements that could be asserted as the basis for restrictive
(or expansive) claim constructions"); Scymore, Teaching Function, supra note 25, at 635-36 (describing
several linguistic pitfalls that the patentee must avoid in order to avoid a narrow claim construction).
274. But there might be other laws, regulations, or doctrines that compel disclosure. See infra note
281 and accompanying text.
275. See discussion supra Part IlI.C.
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3. Incorrect Mechanisms
Like any human endeavor, experimental science is susceptible to errors,
omissions, inaccuracies, and failures. 276 And just as scientific articles can
disclose incorrect mechanisms, so too can patent documents. This can
happen for unintentional reasons like poor experimental design, sloppy
research technique, or a flawed hypothesis. Post-publication errors in
scientific articles are handled through corrective measures like erratum and
retraction. 2 7 7 Such errors in granted patents are handled through the reissue
process.278
Interestingly, most misrepresentations in the scientific literature come
from intentional misconduct. 2 79 To prevent such behavior in patent law,
mechanistic disclosures-like all disclosures-would be subject to the
Patent Office's duty of candor and good faith.280 Intentional misconduct
(such as deliberately disclosing a fanciful mechanism in order to obtain
broad claim scope)281 would bar patent issuance 2 82 or, if the patent has
already issued, render it unenforceable.283
276. CHRISTY L. LUDLOW & RAYMOND D. KENT, BUILDING A RESEARCH CAREER 64 (2010).
277. DAVID H. FOSTER, A CONCISE GUIDE TO COMMUNICATION IN SCIENCE & ENGINEERING 287
(2017).
278. Under certain circumstances, the patentee can withdraw an issued patent and submit it for
further examination through a reissue process if the patent is deemed defective. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2012).
One basis for reissue is that the patentee "claim[ed] more or less than he had a right to claim in the
patent." Id. Another basis for reissue is that "the disclosure contains inaccuracies." MPEP, supra note
119, § 1402.
279. Ferric C. Fang et al., Misconduct Accounts for the Majority of Retracted Scientific
Publications, 109 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 17028 (2012); R. Grant Steen, Retractions in the Scientific
Literature: Do Authors Deliberately Commit Research Fraud?, 37 J. MED. ETHICS 113 (2011).
280. The Patent Office imposes a duty of candor and good faith on every individual substantively
involved in the patenting process-including the inventor, the attorney that prepares the patent
application, and the assignee. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) & (c) (2016). The duty exists with respect to each
claim in a patent application, until a patent issues or the application is abandoned. Id. § 1.56(a); MPEP,
supra note 119, § 2001. The rationale for the duty is that the Patent Office "must rely on [applicants']
integrity and deal with them in a spirit oftrust and confidence." Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 319
(1949). This "requires the highest degree of candor and good faith." Id.; accord Molins PLC v. Textron,
Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
281. Inequitable conduct can arise if intentional misconduct (such as a deliberate
misrepresentation or omission of material information from the Patent Office) leads the patentee to
obtain an unwarranted patent claim. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted). Post-filing experimentation that reveals that a disclosed
mechanism is incorrect would require action by the applicant to avoid submission of misleading
technical information and a potential charge of inequitable conduct. Sean B. Seymore, Patenting Around
Failure, 166 U. PA. L. REv. 1139, 1158-73 (2018).
282."[N]o patent will be granted on an application in connection with which fraud on the Office was
practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional
misconduct." 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a); see also Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 792-93 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(explaining that a patent cannot issue if there is inequitable conduct).
283. Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent infringement. MUELLER, supra note
160, at 774-75. The Federal Circuit has held that a lack of candor and good faith at the application stage
with respect to statutory enablement constitutes inequitable conduct. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
All would agree that disclosure of mechanism in the patent document
would be ideal-particularly for opaque inventions.2 84 Again, the ultimate
beneficiary of such disclosure is the public.2" Other researchers could
immediately build upon the mechanistic details without having to waste
time and resources figuring them out themselves. 2 86 Thus, this proposal
aligns with the stated policy goals of the patent system and could bridge the
disconnect between patent law and scientific norms.
A. Patents as Technical Literature
The ultimate goal of the patent system is to promote technological
progress. 287 The disclosure function achieves this goal through knowledge
dissemination.2 88 Disclosure adds to the public storehouse of technical
knowledge that others can use.2 89 This "promote[s] the flow of information
about inventions from patentees to potential future innovators, thereby
stimulating increased and speedier follow-up innovation." 290 Theory posits
that others can improve upon the invention, design around it, or conceive
entirely new inventions-all during the patent term. 29 1
But this theory rests on the assumption that interested researchers
actually read patents. While some researchers certainly do,292 it is often
asserted that most do not.293 Scholars postulate several reasons why this is
the case. First, patents are hard to read; they are often written in hard-to-
understand language, limiting their teaching function.294 Second, many
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
,284. See supra Part II.B.
285. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (explaining that "the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring
new . .. technologies into the public domain through disclosure" which aligns "with the very purpose of
the patent laws" of providing "building blocks of further innovation").
286. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
287. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
288. See discussion supra Part I.A.
289. See sources cited supra note 49. For a discussion of the storehouse, see supra text
accompanying notes 67-75.
290. Fromer, supra note 66, at 599.
291. Id. at 548-49.
292. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 803, 808 n.9, 809 (1988) ("There is a significant amount of evidence
showing that inventors in many fields rely on published patents for technical information . , . ."); Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 548 (2012)
(drawing a similar conclusion based on an empirical study).
293. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 19, 22 n.16 (2008)
("[R]esearch suggests that scientists don't in fact gain much of their knowledge from patents, turning
instead to other sources.").
294. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 25, at 633-41 (discussing the problem of
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researchers deem patent disclosures unreliable-due to both the absence of
a requirement for proof of concept2 95 and the lack of peer review.2 96 Third
and relatedly, many scientists are not trained to read patents; they have
learned that research funding, reputation, and tenure decisions turn on
publications in peer-reviewed technical journals. 29 7  Fourth, patent
disclosures can become stale given the lag time between filing the
application and its ultimate publication. 2 98 Fifth, some researchers may
deliberately avoid reading patents out of fear that doing so could open the
door to liability for willful infringement.299 Sixth, some researchers ignore
patents because they view them as antithetical to traditional scientific norms
of open sharing and discourse. 00 Finally, the disclosed information is often
lacking in substance when compared to other forms of technical literature.30 '
"patentcsc," which is often indecipherable).
295. An inventor can obtain a patent with no actual (physical) proof of concept; meaning that an
applicant need not verify that everything claimed actually works. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502-03 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457,
461 (C.C.P.A. 1956). It is well settled in U.S. patent law that the mental act of conception of the idea,
and not any physical act, is the important facet of the inventive process. Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525
U.S. 55, 60-61 (1998). Thus, an applicant who "constructively" reduces an invention to practice by
filing a patent application which describes work that has not been actually performed presumably
complies with the disclosure requirements of § 112(a), including enablement. In re Borst, 345 F.2d 851,
855 (C.C.P.A. 1965); Yasuko Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 886 (C.C.P.A. 1973); 3 CHISUM,supra
note 58, § 10.05.
296. Ouellette, supra note 292, at 571. The scientific community evaluates the quality of the
research, experimental results, and accompanying explanation through a legitimization process known
as peer review. Peter Hernon & Candy Schwartz, Peer Review Revisited, 28 LIBR. & INFO. SCI. RES. 1,
1 (2006). It ensures that each research claim is reproducible, logical, independent, and satisfies other
basic conditions for communal acceptability. JOHN M. ZIMAN, REAL SCIENCE 246 (2002).
297. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 25, at 625.
298. Sherkow, supra note 121, at 904; Holbrook, Possession, supra note 66, at 144; see also
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97
YALE L.J. 177, 216-17 (1987) (explaining how application review at the Patent Office slows the
dissemination of information in the scientific community).
299. Holbrook, Possession, supra note 66, at 142 ("The doctrine of willful infringement provides
another structural infirmity to the ability of patcnts to perform a teaching function."); Fromer, supra note
66, at 588 ("[T]hc rule of willful infringement hinders the patent system's disclosure function."); Collcen
V. Chien, Contextualizing Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REv. 1849, 1886 (2016) (explaining how the
willfulness infringement doctrine creates obstacles to reading patents).
300. Eisenberg, supra note 298, at 181-84; Lee, supra note 141, at 661; see also Arti Kaur Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms ofScience, 94 Nw. U. L.
REv. 77, 90 (1999) (explaining that in light of the strong norm in science that "scientific knowledge is
ultimately a shared resource" for the public domain, "claiming property rights in invention is often seen
as immoral.").
301. See Devlin, supra note 66, at 403 (explaining how the information disclosed in many patent
documents is inadequate); Sherkow, supra note 121, at 852 ("[I]t seems clear that patents, especially for
complex or statistically bound inventions, routinely disclose information that does not meet the strictures
of scientific publishing); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, I 10 MICH. L. REV. 709, 746(2012) ("[T]hc fact that many of those patents obfuscate the technology at issue, deliberately or because
we lack a clear language for communicating some types of inventions, means that the payoff from
reading those applications is often dubious.").
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Those reading the patent may need to look elsewhere to fill in gaps.302
Mechanistic enablement would be a significant step toward reducing or
removing these obstacles. First, patents disclosing mechanism provide more
detailed technical information than those that merely explain how to make
and use the invention. 33 Mechanistic enablement fills a knowledge void that
future innovators need not fill themselves. 3  This avoids duplicative
research and promotes technological progress.305 Second, the proposed
disclosure inducements-broader claim scope and a third-party
experimental use privilege-would encourage inventors to elucidate
mechanism and disclose it. 306 Either scenario would encourage inventors
and innovators to read patents.
B. Reducing the Information Deficit
What occurs during patent examination is crucial given the potential
strength and scope of the exclusory rights at stake. 30 7 The patent system
relies on examiners to serve as gatekeepers charged with the task of
protecting the public from the burden of improvident patents.308 Examiners
carry out this task by ensuring that claims are "examined, scrutinized,
limited, and made to conform to what [the applicant] is entitled to."309
But the examiner's task is hindered by an information deficit. To a large
extent, the assurance of a good Patent Office examination is all about
information. 3 10 Clearly, an examiner should have in hand as much technical
302. Note, supra note 52, at 2025-26; see also Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PIr.
L. REv. 1, 6 (2012) (describing the teaching function of patents as "useless," "incomplete," and
"opaque"). This is why some scholars view the statutory enablement requirement as weak. See, e.g.,
Parchomovsky & Mattioli, supra note 142, at 230 (explaining that "[tihe Patent Act imposes a very
modest enablement requirement"); Merges & Nelson, supra note 73, at 845 (explaining how the
enablement requirement has been applied "rather loosely"); cf Fromer, supra note 66, at 596 (observing
that "disclosure norms and rules are lax.").
303. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.; discussion supra Part I.B.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
305. See sources cited supra note 260.
306. See supra Part Ill.C.
307. Cf Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)
(regarding the public's interest in the patent grant as "paramount" given the social and economic
consequences of a patent).
308. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., THE EXAMINATION SYSTEM IN THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE 26 (Comm. Print.
1961); Jeffrey M. Kuhn, Information Overload at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Reframing the
Duty of Disclosure in Patent Law as a Search and Filter Problem, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 90, 92-93
(2011).
309. Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phx. Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877).
310. Cf Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 748 (2009) ("The assurance of a good patent quality is all about
information. . . .").
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information as possible to accurately gauge patentability.3 1 ' But, for a
variety of reasons, this does not happen. 3 12 To begin, the examiner is
disconnected from mainstream science and technology. 3 13  Since the
examiner is not an active researcher, one cannot expect this individual to
know what is happening at the frontlines of theory and experiment in the
technical field. And it is at the frontlines where patent protection is often
sought. 314
Further exacerbating the problem is the inventor's information
advantage. The inventor is generally a person of extraordinary skill 315 who
knows more about the invention and technical field than the examiner.3 16
Sometimes this leads the inventor to be strategic-sharing no more
information than is absolutely necessary to satisfy the patentability
criteria. 3 17 Such behavior compromises patent (examination) quality.318
Disclosing mechanism would do much to close this information gap.
Elucidating mechanism takes time and effort, which places the invention
further down the R&D path-generating knowledge along the way.319
Including mechanistic information in the patent application gives the
examiner a more complete picture of the invention and the surrounding
311. See Beth Simone Noveck, "Peer to Patent": Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and
Patent Reform, 20 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124 (2006).
312. See id. (noting that examiners making patenting decisions based on "a limited subset of
available information"); Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101
GEO. L.J. 637, 647 (2013) ("[T]he PTO only has the information provided by the patent applicant and
whatever limited information the patent examiner is able to discover on her own.").
313. Seymore, Patently Impossible, supra note 6, at 1512-14.
314. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495,
1504 (2001) (suggesting that a firm may obtain a patent to "stake their claim" in an area of technology
to signal to investors and competitors that it operates at the cutting edge); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals,
69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 647-49 (2002) (arguing that firms obtain patents to show their R&D acumen or
technological capacity).
315. Unlike the PHOSITA, patent law presumes that inventors have extraordinary skill. Standard
Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
316. Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 733 (2004); Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1357
(Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[T]he patent practice includes recognition that the inventor usually knows more about
the field than does the 'expert' patent examiner."); see also Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley,
Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 53 (2007) (explaining that
examiners "have backgrounds roughly related to the technology at hand, but .. . are rarely experts on
the precise details of the relevant invention").
317. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 579 ("Experience teaches, however, that applicant
obligations of candor may be tempered by the great incentive they possess not to disclose information
that might deleteriously impact their prospective patent rights."); Holbrook, supra note 54, at 818
(exploring the incentives for applicants to behave strategically and withhold certain information from
the examiner, particularly in the absence of an adversarial check).
318. Sean B. Seymore, Patent Asymmetries, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 963, 991-92 (2016)
[hereinafter Seymore, Patent Asymmetries]. Mark Lemley has argued that "the PTO issues many patents
that would have been rejected had the examiner possessed perfect knowledge." Lemley, supra note 314,
at 1500.
319. Cotropia, Early Filing, supra note 127, at 122.
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technological landscape. This not only allows the examiner to do a better
job,3 20 but also may strengthen the inventor's case for patentability-
particularly for inventions emerging from new, poorly understood, and
paradigm-shifting technologies, as well as inventions from fields with a
poor track record of success.3 21 And it is worth reiterating that mechanistic
enablement can bolster statutory enablement-particularly for
embodiments that the inventor has not made or tested.322 Finally, more
transparency by the inventor would improve patent (examination) quality.3 23
C. Aligning Patent Law with Scientific Norms
Patent law and science promote technological progress through the
dissemination of knowledge.3 24 Indeed, the two spheres have much in
common when it comes to the role of disclosure in achieving certain ends.
For example, in both spheres there is hope that the disclosed information
will enrich the public storehouse of technical knowledge and spur further
creative activity.32 5 This is why both patent law and science require a
disclosure that indicates successful invention and teaches something that is
novel, nontrivial, and reproducible by skilled artisans in the technical
field.326 However, different knowledge transfer paradigms-early
disclosure in patent law 3 2 7 and peer review in science 32 8-have created a
divide between the spheres that the proposed regime seeks to bridge.
One shared goal is to push back technological frontiers by emphasizing
original, challenging research endeavors. 32 9  In patent law, the
nonobviousness requirement explicitly denies patents for trivial inventions
that would have come about through ordinary technological progress.330
This induces inventors to explore challenging endeavors rather than easy
ones. 3 3 1 Scientific research works the same way, giving a nod to researchers
320. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 25, at 653.
321. See Seymore, Patently Impossible, supra note 6, at 1494 (explaining the patentability hurdles
for such inventions).
322. For an illustration, see supra Part Ill.B.2(a).
323. Seymore, Patent Asymmetries, supra note 318, at 1010.
324. Eisenberg, supra note 298, at 181.
325. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
326. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 25, at 663.
327. See discussion supra Part IlI.B.
328. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 51 and 65; CHRIS P. MILLER & MARK J. EVANS, THE CHEMIST'S
COMPANION TO PATENT LAW 302 (2010) (explaining how, as a matter of public policy, patent law seeks
to encourage scientific breakthroughs).
330. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
331. Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
127, 137 (2000); Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of
Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 547, 549 (2008).
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n 332
who pursue difficult, risky endeavors or those with uncertain outcomes.
It balks at research endeavors that are "overly conservative, [and] perhaps
even wasting societal resources on too-safe technology that might be spent
on other human endeavors or social needs."333
The corollary is that challenging inventions are the ones that drive
technological progress. 3 4 By nature challenging inventions involve
uncertain outcomes; but this type of uncertainty is good for creativity. 3 3 5
Uncertainty drives innovative activity because the inability to sufficiently
predict a project's outcome provides the motivation to dive in and figure it
out.3 36 So, if the nondisclosure rule endures out of fear that some inventions
might prove too difficult to understand, 3 37 such reasoning undervalues
uncertainty and unpredictability. As explained by one scientist:
Every important discovery in science is by definition unpredictable.
If it were predictable, it would not be an important discovery. The
purpose of science is to create opportunities for unpredictable things
to happen. When nature does something unexpected, we learn
something about how nature works .... [It is] accurate to define
science as organized unpredictability. 33 8
The broader point is that meaningful science is, by its very nature,
difficult. 3 9 In the realm of patent law, efforts to elucidate mechanism, and
the information that flows from such efforts, could do much to promote
technological progress. 34 0
332. See PAUL R. BEUE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE MODERN ECONOMY: BASIC TOPICS
AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS 97 (1998) (discussing technological uncertainty and innovation); Goran
Ekvall, Creative Climate, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CREATIVITY 403, 407 (Mark A. Runco & Steven R.
Pritzker eds., 1999) ("Innovation involves risk.").
333. Henry Petroski, The Success ofFailure, 42 TECH. & CULTURE 321, 328 (2001).
334. Included here are serendipitous inventions-those where the inventor set out to make Xbut
instead made Y. FIRESTEIN, supra note 102, at 44-45. They tend to promote technological progress
particularly well because scientific principles that were seemingly well understood and settled are
suddenly thrust wide open, thereby "enabl[ing] science to advance into domains of understanding that
were not previously imagined." ZIMAN, supra note 296, at 217. After the initial bewilderment, the
discovery tends to spawn two types ofinquiry: basic research, which seeks to understand what happened;
and applied research, which opens new frontiers for exploration. Seymore, supra note 102, at 210.
335. "[U]ncertainty leads to choice, and choice favors mindfulness, which paves the way for
creativity." Becca Levy & Ellen Langer, Aging, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CREATIVITY, supra note 332, at
45, 46.
336. See LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB & PHILIP E. AUERSWALD, TAKING TECHNICAL RISKS: HOW
INNOVATORS, EXECUTIVES, AND INVESTORS MANAGE HIGH-TECH RISKS 44-45 (2001); see also GUY
CLAXTON & BILL LUCAS, BE CREATIVE: ESSENTIAL STEPS TO REVITALIZE YOUR WORK AND LIFE 24
(2004) ("[Ulncertainty requires ... creativ[ity], and creativity requires uncertainty.").
337. For a discussion of the nondisclosure rule, see supra Part II.A.
338. FREEMAN DYSON, FROM EROS TO GAIA 68 (1992).
339. Cf ZIMAN, supra note 296, at42 ("Original research is difficult.").
340. This is true even if there is a significant time lag between figuring out how to make and use
the invention (statutory enablement) and how and why it works (mechanistic enablement). Perhaps the
best example is aspirin, patented by Bayer in 1900. See Acetyl Salicylic Acid, U.S. Patent No. 644,077
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D. Tensions
One potential concern of the proposed regime is that it asks the patent
system to do too much. Even if all agree that understanding mechanism is
an activity that should be encouraged,34 ' one could argue that it can be done
outside of the patent system. 342 It is certainly true that a considerable amount
of basic research at universities has been produced and disclosed without
patents.3 43 And non-patent inducements like reputation, publication, or
intellectual curiosity can lead to mechanistic disclosure."
A related concern is whether the patent system is equipped to handle
mechanistic enablement. Evaluating it would add an administrative burden
to the Patent Office-an agency that is already strained for resources. 34 5 To
be sure, an enablement analysis is the most formidable task that a patent
examiner can undertake. 3 46 And it becomes more formidable for complex
inventions.3 47 So it is fair to ask if the examiner has the time, incentive,
(filed Aug. 1, 1898) (issued Feb. 27, 1900). It was used as a pain reliever for over 70 years before Sir
John Vane elucidated the mechanism. John R. Vane, Inhibition of Prostaglandin Synthesis as a
Mechanism ofAction for Aspirin-like Drugs, 231 NATURE NEW BIOLOGY 232, 232-35 (1971). Vane's
Nobel Prize-winning discovery spawned an incredible amount of aspirin research, including its use to
prevent heart disease and stroke. See DIARMULD JEFFREYS, ASPIRIN: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF A
WONDER DRUG 235-77 (2004). To the extent that the proposed paradigm could narrow the time lag, the
end result would be speedier follow-on innovation and public benefit. See source cited supra note 290
and accompanying text.
341. See discussion supra Part II.C.
342. It is certainly true that in some cases, the peer-reviewed literature provides sufficient
mechanistic information. See Ouellette, supra note 292, at 572 (explaining that one reason why
researchers ignore patents is because the information disclosed therein is duplicative of what is available
in the scientific literature).
343. Rai, supra note 300, at 119; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV.
1663, 1667 (1996) (arguing that patent incentives are unnecessary for federally-sponsored research since
the government has already paid for it). But "it bears mention that the type of research that emerges as
a result of patent incentives may be quite different from the research that would emerge in the absence
of such incentives." Rai, supra note 300, at 119-20.
344. See Rantanen, supra note 302, at 19-20 (providing various reasons why inventors may
choose to disclose, including reputational benefits). Of course, a patent might provide an additional
inducement. See Holbrook, Possession, supra note 66, at 146 ("An inventor who anticipates obtaining a
patent on an invention will be more willing to publish a scientific article or other sort of disclosure to
the public, because she knows her invention will eventually be protected by a patent and not by a trade
secret."). But see Devlin, supra note 66, at 416-22 (criticizing patent law's disclosure theory).
345. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 148, at 22 (explaining that the Patent Office lacks the
resources to effectively evaluate applications); COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
81-83 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (describing the additional resources that the Patent Office
will need to improve its performance).
346. Sean B. Seymore, Reinvention, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1031, 1034 (2017).
347. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 67 (2010). To be sure, it is
easier to gauge enablement in simple inventions like paper clips and broom rakes than in more complex
inventions like chemical compounds. Seymore, Presumption, supra note 25, at 1019.
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expertise, and resources to adequately evaluate mechanistic enablement.3 48
There are several responses to these concerns. First, while it is true that
mechanistic enablement can be provided through other media, it must be
remembered that some inventions are only disclosed in patent documents.34 9
Details about many inventions never appear in the non-patent technical
literature.3 50 So one interested in understanding them must rely solely on the
patent's disclosure. 35 1 If mechanistic enablement is not provided, an
interested researcher must fill this knowledge void.352 Again, the proposed
regime would induce inventors to elucidate and disclose mechanism in the
patent document, thereby avoiding duplicative third-party experimentation
and allowing quicker entry into the public storehouse of technical
knowledge. 353
Second, it is certainly true that evaluating mechanistic enablement would
be more demanding than statutory enablement. One concern is whether an
examiner can competently evaluate mechanisms. Even though the examiner
is not an active researcher, 354 the examiner has expertise in a specific
technological field.3 55 One would think that this expertise should be
sufficient to detect implausible mechanisms. Another concern is time-
examiners face time pressures and production goals. 356 The Patent Office is
aware of this problem and seeks to solve it.3 57 But there is another side to
348. See MIELE, supra note 168, at 97-98 (discussing examiner concerns and incentives); Noveck,
supra note 311, at 132 (discussing examiner time and resource constraints); DAN L. BURK & MARK A.
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 23 (2009) ("[A]n examiner has no
incentive to spend more time on harder cases."). Examiners have between eight and twenty-five hours
to evaluate an application. FTC REPORT, supra note 69, ch. 5, at 5. Examiner incentives are complicated;
certain tasks "count" more for production goals, promotion, and bonus decisions than others. Mark A.
Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 817, 818 (2012).
349. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 25, at 656.
350. This is particularly true in industrial settings, where scientists publish relatively little. See
generally Benoit Godin, Research and the Practice of Publication in Industries, 25 RES. POL'Y 587
(1996) (presenting various explanations and using bibliometrics to assess the usefulness of publication
in industry). The highest priority for an industrial inventor is to generate results that show commercial
promise and will ultimately find their way into a marketable product. Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. David,
Information Disclosure and the Economics ofScience and Technology, in ARROW AND THE ASCENT OF
MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY 519, 522 (George R. Feiwel ed., 1987); see also Diana Hicks, Published
Papers, Tacit Competencies and Corporate Management ofthe Public/Private Character ofKnowledge,
4 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 401, 412-14 (1995) ("After all, writing papers makes no money and
consumes time.").
351. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 25, at 664-66.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
353. See supra notes 259-261 and accompanying text.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 313-314.
355. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136-37 (2016); see also In re Berg,
320 F.3d 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (describing patent examiners as "persons of scientific competence
in the fields in which they work").
356. See supra note 348.
357. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Recently Announced Changes to
USPTO's Examiner Count System Go into Effect (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2010/
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the story. As previously discussed, critics have long argued that a major
contributor to the patent quality problem is that examiners lack adequate
technical information to conduct a rigorous examination.35 Providing
mechanistic enablement would give the examiner a more complete picture
of the invention and do much to solve the information deficit. 359 This
additional information might require more time to evaluate; however, this
might be an appropriate tradeoff to improve patent (examination) quality. 360
So I would argue that any additional burden required for the Patent Office
to evaluate mechanistic enablement would be slight in comparison to the
benefits that would flow from it.
CONCLUSION
Disclosure is often touted as a principal benefit of the patent system,
giving the public access to knowledge that can stimulate ideas and promote
technological progress. Yet the disclosure function falls short in achieving
these goals because patent law only requires minimal disclosure from the
inventor. Indeed, an inventor can obtain a patent without disclosing how or
why the invention works. The resulting patent has limited technical value
because follow-on researchers must figure out the omitted information. This
problem has intensified as inventions have become more complex over
time. This Article argues that encouraging inventors to fill this knowledge
void will produce more technically-robust patent documents that will allow
follow-on innovators to more easily and quickly improve on current
technologies and will foster the diffusion of knowledge and more creative
innovation within and across disciplines. Inducing inventors to provide
mechanistic disclosures would do much to bridge the gap between patent
law and scientific norms. And by reinvigorating the teaching function of
patents, mechanistic disclosure would allow the patent system to truly fulfill
its broader mission of promoting scientific progress and extending the
frontiers of knowledge.
10_08jsp [https://perma.cc/7N6P-RVEV] (announcing changes that will give examiners more time to
review applications, rebalance incentives, and improve morale).
358. See supra notes 316-318 and accompanying text; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 348, at 51
(explaining that while the Patent Office's accessible information sources might be sufficient to gauge
patentability for mechanical and chemical fields, this may not be true in fields like software where the
relevant information is inaccessible to the agency).
359. For a deeper discussion of the information deficit in patent examination, see Seymore, Patent
Asymmetries, supra note 318, at 991-96.
360. See supra Part IV.B.
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